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A Dynamic Logic for Privacy Compliance
Guillaume Aucher · Guido Boella · Leendert van
der Torre
Abstract Knowledge based privacy policies are more declarative than traditional action
based ones, because they specify only what is permitted or forbidden to know, and leave
the derivation of the permitted actions to a security monitor. This inference problem is
already non trivial with a static privacy policy, and becomes challenging when privacy
policies can change over time. We therefore introduce a dynamic modal logic that permits
not only to reason about permitted and forbidden knowledge to derive the permitted ac-
tions, but also to represent explicitly the declarative privacy policies together with their
dynamics. The logic can be used to check both regulatory and behavioral compliance, re-
spectively by checking that the permissions and obligations set up by the security monitor
of an organization are not in conflict with the privacy policies, and by checking that these
obligations are indeed enforced.
1 Introduction
The UN Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly, 1948) stipu-
lates that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation” (our emphasis).
However, there is no consensus on what privacy precisely means. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, Warren and Brandeis (1890), quoting the judge Thomas M. Cooley, defined the right
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to privacy as “the right to be let alone”. More recently, Westin (1968) defines privacy as the
ability for people to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent, information
about them is communicated to others. Despite this lack of consensus in the legislation,
numerous privacy policies have recently been developped. In 2001, 68% of the Direct
Marketing Association member companies appoint Chief Privacy Officers responsible for
privacy issues and policies. They design their internal activities and information practices
to simultaneously serve their customers effectively and manage risks from disclosure of
sensitive information. A much debated example of privacy policy in the United States is
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (Office for Civil Rights,
2003). Personal health information must be used to provide effective health care, but it
must also be protected from indiscriminate sharing to respect the privacy of patients. Other
examples are the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) (Federal Trade Com-
mission, 1998) for e-business, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) (Federal Trade
Commission, 1999) for financial institutions.
In general, privacy policies can be defined either in terms of permitted and forbidden
knowledge, or in terms of permitted and forbidden actions. For example, it may be forbid-
den to know the medical data of a person, or it may be forbidden to disclose these data.
Both of these approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. Implementing a pri-
vacy policy based on permitted and forbidden actions is relatively easy, since we can add a
filter on the system checking the outgoing messages. Such a filter is an example of a secu-
rity monitor. If the system attempts to send a forbidden message, then the security monitor
blocks the sending of that message. However, the price to pay for this relatively straight-
forward implementation is that it is difficult to determine privacy policies using permitted
and forbidden actions only, in the sense that it is difficult to decide which actions are per-
mitted or forbidden so that a piece of information is not disclose. For example, it is a well
known database problem that you may be able to find out my identity without asking for
it explicitly, for example by asking a very detailed question (all the people who are born
in Amsterdam on September 11 1986, who drive a blue Mercedes, and who are married
to a person from Paris on November 9, 2009), or by combining a number of queries on
a medical database (Sweeney, 2002). In this paper we are therefore interested in privacy
policies expressed in terms of permitted and forbidden knowledge.
Expressing a privacy policy in terms of permitted and forbidden knowledge is rela-
tively easy, since it lists the situations which should not occur. These situations are typi-
cally determined by the fact that it may not be permitted to know some sensitive informa-
tion. In many cases it is more efficient or natural to specify that a given piece of informa-
tion may not be known, than explicitly forbidding the different ways of communicating it.
The policies are more declarative, more concise and therefore easier to understand by the
user. They may also cover unforeseen sequences of actions leading to forbidden situation.
However, implementing a privacy policy based on permitted and forbidden knowledge
is relatively difficult, since the system has to reason about the relation between permit-
ted knowledge and actions. The challenge is that the exchange of messages changes the
knowledge, and the security monitor therefore needs to reason about these changes.
To express privacy policies in terms of permitted and forbidden knowledge, we use
modal logic, since both knowledge and obligations (and permissions) are traditionally and
naturally modeled in branches of modal logic called epistemic and deontic logic respec-
tively. Cuppens introduced in 1993 a modal logic for a logical formalization of secrecy
(Cuppens, 1993), and together with Demolombe he developed a logic for reasoning about
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confidentiality (Cuppens and Demolombe, 1996) and a modal logical framework for se-
curity policies (Cuppens and Demolombe, 1997). The logic models the knowledge of the
users of the system, and allows the security monitor to reason about them. It expresses for-
mulas such as ‘the user knows the address of someone’, and epistemic norms, i.e. norms
regulating what is permitted to know. The security monitor is able to foresee the infer-
ences that the users can do by combining their knowledge. For example, if the user knows
street name, number, town and state of a person, then he knows his address. Moreover,
since privacy policies are specified in terms of knowledge that the recipient of informa-
tion is permitted/forbidden to have, we can represent violations. This is an advantage over
privacy policy languages modeling norms as strict constraints that cannot be violated, be-
cause in some situations it is necessary to cope with violations. These violations can be
due for example to occasional and unintentional disclosures, or to the creation of new more
restrictive norms.
The main task of a security monitor reasoning about a situation given a privacy policy
is to check compliance – regardless of whether these policies are expressed in terms of
permitted and forbidden actions or permitted and forbidden knowledge. In our approach,
to check compliance one has therefore to be able to derive the permitted, obligatory and
forbidden actions in a given context, just like a decision maker needs to know whether
his alternative actions do not violate norms and may therefore be subject to sanctions. In
this paper, we further distinguish between regulatory compliance and behavioural compli-
ance. Regulatory compliance checks whether the permissions and obligations set up by the
security monitor of an organization (e.g., company, web-service . . . ) are compliant with
respect to the privacy policies set up by the law/policy makers. Behavioural compliance
checks whether these very obligations and permissions are indeed enforced in the system
by the security monitor of the organization.
Despite its strengths, the Cuppens-Demolombe logic cannot express whether the sit-
uation is (regulatory or behaviourally) compliant with respect to a privacy policy. The
problem is that the logic can define privacy policies in terms of the permitted and for-
bidden knowledge of the resulting epistemic state of the recipient of information, but it
cannot derive the permitted messages nor the obligatory messages by combining and rea-
soning on this knowledge. Our modal logic addresses these problems and extends the
Cuppens-Demolombe logic with dynamic update operators inspired from the ones of dy-
namic epistemic logic (van Ditmarsch et al, 2007). These dynamic operators model both
the dynamics of knowledge and of privacy policies. They can add or remove norms from
the policy, and we add constants expressing whether the system is regulatorily and be-
haviourally compliant with a policy, i.e., there is no violation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the range of phenomena
under study, and we give a number of examples to provide some intuitions. In Section 3,
we introduce our Dynamic Epistemic Deontic Logic (DEDL). We start with the static
part, defining epistemic norms and privacy policies, and we then add dynamics, defining
permitted (and obligatory) messages and enforcements of privacy policies. In Section 4,
we propose a new logic based on the logic of Section 3 which is more appropriate for
checking compliance.
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2 Our scenario of privacy policies
In this paper, we consider a single agent (Sender) communicating information from a
knowledge base to another agent (Recipient), with the effect that the Recipient knows
the information. The Sender is subject to privacy policies which restrict the messages he is
permitted to send to the Recipient. The Sender is therefore a security monitor. We illustrate
the distinction between norms of transmission of information and epistemic norms with
an example:
Example 1 Consider a Sender s, e.g., a web server, which is subject to a privacy regula-
tion: he should not communicate the address a of a person to the Recipient r. We could
write this as a norm of transmission of information, regulating the sending of a message:
¬Ps(Send a), which denotes the denial that the Sender sends message a. Instead, in an
epistemic norm perspective, this prohibition can be derived from the prohibition for the
Sender that the Recipient comes to know the address: Kra. This is expressed by a deon-
tic operator indexed by the Sender and having as content the ideal knowledge Kr of the
Recipient: ¬PsKra.
This distinction is bridged by modelling sending actions performed by the Sender
which update the knowledge of the Recipient.
Example 2 The action of sending the message, [Send a], expresses that the Sender sends
to the Recipient the address a. The result of this action is that the Recipient knows a: Kra.
Since Kra is not permitted by the epistemic norm ¬PsKra, the Sender during his decision
process derives that also the action [Send a] is not permitted: ¬Ps(Send a). Analogously,
all other possible actions leading to the forbidden epistemic state Kra, if any, are prohibited
too. For example, if the address is composed by street m, number n and town t such that
(m∧ n∧ t) ↔ a, then the sequence of messages [Send m][Send n][Send t] leads to the
forbidden epistemic state Kra.
Given the assumptions made in this paper, there is an asymmetry in the modeling of
what the Sender and the Recipient know. In the current model we consider only one source
of information, so the Sender’s point of view is the objective one and can be represented
as factual knowledge, e.g., we read a as the Sender knows the address. We assume also
that the Sender never lies, so we talk about “knowledge” of the Recipient: the result of
Sender’s actions on the epistemic state of the Recipient is knowledge rather than belief:
Kra implies a, i.e., that the Sender holds a as true. If instead we allowed the Sender to lie
to protect some secrets (as, e.g., Bonatti et al (1995) do), then the result of the action of
sending messages would be a mere belief of the Recipient: the result of [Send a] would
be that the Recipient believes a, but a - from the point of view of the Sender - would not
follow from this.
A logical approach to privacy provides a natural solution to the so-called inference
problem (Hinke, 1988), i.e., how further permissions propagate from permitted informa-
tion:
Example 3 Assume it is prohibited to know the street where some person lives. Thus, it
must be prohibited to know the address of this person. If m∧n∧ t ↔ a, then ¬PsKrm im-
plies ¬PsKra. Viceversa, if it is permitted to know the address, then it must be permitted to
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know the street. The same kind of reasoning is transferred at the level of norms of trans-
mission of information. For example, ¬Ps(Send m) implies ¬Ps(Send a): if it is prohibited
to send the name of the street, it is prohibited to send the entire address.
Note that to attribute knowledge to the Recipient, it is neither necessary to have user
profiles nor to have any uncertainty. This stems from the assumption that the Sender is
for the Recipient the only source of information concerning the knowledge base. The only
knowledge that should be considered is the one derived from the past interactions between
the two agents, i.e., the information already disclosed by the Sender. Assuming for sim-
plicity that the Sender is rational and sends only information consistent with his previous
messages, there is no need to introduce some kind of belief revision.
When the forbidden state is achieved by a sequence of messages, there is the possibility
that each message of the sequence is permitted while the resulting state is prohibited: this
is a new kind of the Chinese wall problem (Brewer and Nash, 1989), considered from
the double perspective of both knowledge of the Recipient and messages by the Sender.
A Chinese wall security policy is an example of aggregation exception. The exception is
given by a system that maintains two pieces of information and a user is authorized to
access one or the other, but not both.
Example 4 (Website example) Consider the information about websites contacted by a
user (the Recipient), which are available on a server (the Sender) logfile. The list of web-
sites for each user is clearly a sensitive information which he would not like to disclose.
However, knowing which websites have been visited is a valuable information, for exam-
ple, for the configuration of a firewall, or to make statistics. Thus it has become anonym
by replacing the names of the users with numbers by means of a hashcode (h). So even
if one knows the list of users one cannot understand who contacted which website. How-
ever, from the association between users and numbers and between numbers and websites
the original information can be reconstructed. Therefore the mappings from the users to
the numbers (c) and from the numbers to the websites (e) can be distributed individually
but not altogether since their association would allow to reconstruct the mapping from the
users to the websites they visited (v): c∧ e→ v.
A solution to enforce this privacy policy could be to forbid the distribution of a map-
ping if the other one has been already distributed, using a language like the one proposed
by Barth et al (2007), which is able to express policies about the flow of information
referring to actions already performed. This solution, however, requires two rules corre-
sponding to the possible permutations of messages. Moreover, this solution is not gen-
eral, because there can be further ways of making the forbidden information available,
for example by distributing the hash function h used. Expressing a flexible policy on all
the alternative combinations of actions becomes soon unfeasible. Moreover, new ways of
computing the forbidden information could be devised later, which would not be taken
into account by the policy.
In this situation we have that it is permitted to know the individual pieces of informa-
tion, but not what is implied by the conjunction of them:
PsKrc,PsKre,¬PsKrv.
It states that it is permitted to know the mapping between users and numbers (PsKrc), it
is permitted to know the mapping between numbers and websites visited (PsKre) but it is
not permitted to know the mapping between users and their websites visited (¬PsKrv). We
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have the same situation from the point of view of permissions concerning actions: it is per-
mitted to send the messages c and e individually, but not their combination: Ps(Send c)∧
Ps(Send e) but ¬Ps(Send (e∧c)) otherwise the epistemic norm ¬PsKrv would be violated.
This means that after sending one of the two messages, the other one becomes prohibited:
[Send e]¬Ps(Send c) and [Send c] ¬Ps(Send e).
Some privacy policies prescribe not only which messages are forbidden, but also which
messages are obligatory. We can lift these obligations at the level of epistemic norms:
Example 5 (Spyware Example) Assume that the list of websites mentioned in e and sent
by Sender can disclose websites where it is possible to download software. If Sender knows
that there is the risk that such software contains spyware (y), then the Recipient should
‘know’ it. This privacy policy is expressed by a single epistemic norm:
y∧Kre→ OsKry
We can generalize this kind of policies to situations where the Sender should inform
the Recipient whether a piece of information has some property or not:
Example 6 When the knowledge base contains classified information and the Recipient
has some specific role, then the Sender should inform the Recipient whether the message
p he sent contains classified information (c) or not:
role(r)∧Krp→ Os(Krc∨Kr¬c)
The policy does not contain in the antecedent the fact that Sender communicated p, but
only that Recipient knows p: recall that we assume that the only source of information for
the Recipient is the sender, so this epistemic state must be the result of a previous message
by the Sender.
Note that in this example we have that the norm is applicable only in a context where
the Recipient plays a given role. Indeed, as discussed by Barth et al (2007) in the theory of
contextual integrity, privacy norms are relevant only in some context, usually defined by
roles played by Sender and Recipient.
When introducing the new notions of permitted and obligatory epistemic states and
the corresponding permissions and obligations to send a message, it is necessary to clarify
what the notion of compliance becomes.
Example 7 A message is permitted (Ps(Send a)), if sending it does not lead to a non-
compliant situation: i.e., if sending it does not violate some epistemic obligation. For ex-
ample, sending the message a ([Send a]) leads to a state where Kra while at the same time
¬PsKra (i.e., Os¬Kra). A message is obligatory (Os(Send a)) when the Recipient does not
already know the information (¬Kra), it is permitted to send the message (Ps(Send a)) and
it is obligatory that the Recipient knows the content of the message (OsKra)
Many privacy policy languages, like Barth et al (2006), view norms as strict constraints
which cannot be violated. This reduces the flexibility since in some situations it is neces-
sary to cope with violations.
A Dynamic Logic for Privacy Compliance 7
Example 8 Assume that the Sender discloses some prohibited information (e.g., ¬PsKra),
and this leads to a non-compliant situation: [Send a](Kra∧¬PsKra). In this situation, the
Sender is subject to further requirements, for example to make the Recipient know that the
information is classified c: Kra→ OsKrc.
The possibility of nesting formulas with epistemic and deontic modalities allows us to
express meta-policies, i.e., policies concerning the disclosure of policies, as proposed for
example by Bonatti et al (1995):
Example 9 Sometimes, informing the Recipient about the prohibition to send some in-
formation might lead him to infer something he should not know. For example, if the
Recipient asks whether a person is a secret agent (p), replying “I cannot tell this to you” to
the question makes the Recipient infer that the person is actually a secret agent, otherwise
the answer would have been “no”. To avoid this case, it should be prohibited to let the
Recipient know the policy that knowing p is prohibited:
¬PsKr¬PsKrp
In contrast, if a policy is permitted to be known, it can even be communicated to the
Recipient. If PsKrPsKrp then it is permitted to send the message PsKrp: Ps(Send PsKrp).
This illustrates also that policies can be the content of messages.
Finally, policies have a dynamic character for several motivations. A major source of
modification in policies is due to the internal IT system management, to new user require-
ments or to adapt the system against new possible security threats. Moreover, it is well
known that law has a dynamic character since it is subject both to continuous change by
the legislator and to the interpretation process of law in courts (see Boella et al (2010) for
a formal model of interpretation). The two problems are interconnected, since changes of
policies not due to changes in law must be assured to be compliant with laws and further
changes may be due to ensure this compliance.
For these reasons in our model, we consider how to introduce new norms in policies
composed by epistemic norms.
Example 10 In case of attack by some hacker, the privacy policies can be made more strict.
For example, the Sender can decide to strengthen the privacy policy P of Example 4 to
PsKrc,¬PsKre,¬PsKrv
where PsKre has been replaced by ¬PsKre: it is now prohibited to disclose the mapping
from numbers to visited web-sites. In the same way as we have message sending actions,
we introduce promulgation actions which update the set of norms. The above new privacy
policy can be enforced by the Sender through the update [Prom ¬Kre].
3 Dynamic epistemic deontic logic
The logic for privacy policy reasons about obligation, permission, knowledge, and infor-
mation exchange. To deal with these notions altogether, we first extend in Section 3.1 the
logic of Cuppens and Demolombe (1997), and in Section 3.2 we add dynamics.
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3.1 ‘Static’ privacy policies
3.1.1 Epistemic Deontic Logic (EDL)
We split our language into two kinds of formulas: circumstances and epistemic practi-
tions. The former cannot be in the scope of an obligation operator Os whereas the latter
are always within the scope of a deontic operator Os. Formulas of LEDL are called circum-
stances and formulas of L αEDL are called epistemic practitions. The formula Osα reads as
‘it is obligatory for the Sender that α .’ The formula Psα is an abbreviation for ¬Os¬α and
reads as ‘it is permitted for the Sender that α .’ The formula Krφ reads as ‘the Recipient
knows that φ .’ Pure circumstances are circumstances without obligation operators Osα ,
we call them LEL. In other words, pure circumstances are just (standard) epistemic for-
mulas. This duality between practitions and proposition is derived from Castan˜eda’s well
known approach to deontic logic, who observed the grammatical duality of expressions
depending whether they are within or without the scope of deontic operators (Castan˜eda,
1981) (see the appendix for more details). This yields the following language.
Definition 1 (Syntax of LEDL) Let Φ
φ be a set of propositionnal letters. The language
LEDL is defined inductively as follows.
LEDL : φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧φ | Krφ | Osα
L
α
EDL : α ::= Krφ | ¬α | α ∧α
where p ranges over Φφ .
We have that practitions are also epistemic propositions, in the sense that L αEDL ⊂
LEDL. The duality between practitions and epistemic propositions is illustrated by the
following example.
Example 11 The following formulas are members of both LEDL and L
α
EDL:
– Kra: the receiver knows the address.
– KrKra→ KrOsKra: if the Recipient knows that he knows the address, then he knows
that it is obligatory for the Sender that he knows the address.
The following formulas are members of LEDL but not L
α
EDL:
– ¬PsKra: it is not permitted for the Sender that the Recipient knows the address.
– y∧Kre→OsKry: If Sender knows that there is the risk that software contains spyware
(y), then the Recipient should ‘know’ it.
– role(r)∧Krp→Os(Krc∨Kr¬c): If the Recipient has some specific role and Recipient
knows p, then the Sender should inform the Recipient whether the message p he sent
contains classified information (c) or not.
– Kra→ OsKrc: if the Recipient knows the address, then the Sender is subject to fur-
ther requirements, for example to make the Recipient know that the information is
classified.
The following formulas are not members of LEDL:
– OsOsKrp: there is no nesting of two operators Os without an operator Kr in between.
– Osp: only epistemic formulas are allowed in the scope of a deontic operator.
A Dynamic Logic for Privacy Compliance 9
Consequently, the formula OsKrp→ Osp does not belong to the language LEDL. This
formula is known as A˚qvist’s paradox (A˚qvist, 1967).
Definition 2 (Semantics of LEDL) An EDL-model M is a tuple M = (W,D,R,V ), where
W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R :W → 2W and D :W → 2W are accessibility
relations on W , D being serial, and R being reflexive1, and V : Φφ → 2W is a valuation.
An EDL-frame is an EDL-model without valuation V . The truth conditions are defined
inductively as follows.
M,w |= p iff w ∈V (p)
M,w |= φ ∧ψ iff M,w |= φ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= ¬φ iff not M,w |= φ
M,w |= Osα iff for all v ∈ D(w), M,v |= α.
M,w |= Krφ iff for all v ∈ R(w), M,v |= φ
We writeM |= φ when for all w ∈W ,M,w |= φ . (M,w) is called a pointed EDL-model. If
P is a set of formulas, we writeM,w |= P when M,w |= φ for all φ ∈P .
Theorem 1 (Soundness and completeness) The logic LEDL axiomatized by the following
axiom schemes and inference rules is sound and complete for the language LEDL with
respect to the semantics of EDL-models. We write ⊢ φ for φ ∈ LEDL.
A1 All propositional tautologies based on Φ
φ
A2 ⊢ Osα → Psα
A3 ⊢ Krφ → φ
A4 ⊢ Os(α → α
′)→ (Osα → Osα
′)
A5 ⊢ Kr(φ → φ
′)→ (Krφ → Krφ
′)
R1 If ⊢ α then ⊢ Osα
R2 If ⊢ φ then ⊢ Krφ
R3 If ⊢ φ
∗→ ψ∗ and ⊢ φ ∗ then ⊢ ψ∗
Proof It follows straightforwardly from the Sahlqvist correspondence theorem (Sahlqvist,
1975) because Axioms A2 and A3 are Sahlqvist formulas. QED
Axiom A2 models the fact that an obligation for the Sender should always be permitted.
Axiom A3 models the fact that if the Recipient knows a fact then this fact must be true: it is
an essential property of knowledge. The other axioms model the fact that obligations and
knowledge are closed under logical consequences. We could perfectly add other conditions
on accessibility relations and their corresponding axioms, such as knowledge introspection
(⊢ Krφ → KrKrφ ), and all the results of this paper would still hold. We remain unspecific
about these epistemic issues because we prefer to focus in this paper on our contribution,
which is of a different nature.
Let M be a finite EDL-model and φ be a formula of LDEDL. We define ||M||, the size
of M, to be the sum of the number of possible worlds in M and the number of pairs in R
andD. We define |φ |, the size of φ , to be the number of symbols in φ .2 For a given function
1 An accessibility relation R is serial if and only if R(w) 6= /0 for all worlds w. An accessibility relation R is
reflexive if and only if w ∈ R(w) for all w ∈W . See Blackburn et al (2001) for details.
2 Formally, |φ | is defined inductively as follows: |p| = 1, |¬φ | = |Krφ | = 1+ |φ |, |φ ∧ φ
′| = 1+ |φ |+ |φ ′|,
|Osα|= 1+ |α|, |[Send ψ]φ |= 1+ |ψ|+ |φ |, |[Prom α]φ |= 1+ |α|+ |φ |.
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g(n), we denote by O(g(n)) the set of functions
O(g(n))=
{
f (n)
∣∣∣∣ there are constants c and n0 such that O≤ f (n)≤ cg(n) for all n≥ n0
}
.
Thus, for example, when we say that the running time of model checking whetherM,w |=
φ is O(||M|| × |φ |), this means that there is some constant c, independant of the EDL-
modelM and the formula φ , such that for all pointed EDL-models (M,w) and formulas φ ,
the time to check if M,w |= φ is at most c×||M||× |φ |.
Theorem 2 (Decidability and complexity) The satisfiability problem for LEDL is decid-
able and PSPACE-complete. There is an algorithm that, given a finite pointed EDL-model
(M,w) and a formula φ ∈LEDL, determines, in time O(||M||× |φ |), whether M,w |= φ .
Proof To prove decidability, one shows that LEDL has the finite model property by adapting
the selection method (Blackburn et al, 2001). The proof that the satisfiability problem is
PSPACE can easily be adapted from Halpern and Moses (1992). The algorithm for the
model checking problem is the same as in Fagin et al (1995). QED
3.1.2 Privacy policies and compliance in EDL.
As discussed by Barth et al (2007) in the theory of contextual integrity, privacy norms are
relevant only in some context, usually defined by roles played by Sender and Recipient.
This leads us to define the following notions.
Definition 3 (Epistemic norm and privacy policy)An epistemic norm is a formula of the
form i→ Osα or i→ Psα where i is a pure circumstance and α is an epistemic practition.
The set of epistemic norms is written E N . A privacy policy P is a LEDL-consistent set
of epistemic norms.
Example 12 The following formulas of LEDL can be elements of a privacy policy:
– Os¬Kra: it is not permitted for the Sender that the Recipient knows the address.
– y∧Kre→OsKry: If Sender knows that there is the risk that software contains spyware
(y), then the Recipient should ‘know’ it.
– role(r)∧Krp→Os(Krc∨Kr¬c): If the Recipient has some specific role and Recipient
knows p, then the Sender should inform the Recipient whether the message p he sent
contains classified information (c) or not.
– Kra→ OsKrc: if the Recipient knows the address, then the Sender is subject to fur-
ther requirements, for example to make the Recipient know that the information is
classified.
Note that obligations and permissions concern the knowledge of the Recipient. This fact
should not let the reader think that a privacy policy concerns the behavior of the Recipient.
Indeed, the beliefs of the Recipient are only modified by actions of the Sender, so these
policies regulate the behavior of the Sender who might disclose information or not to the
Recipient depending on whether or not this disclosure is in conflict with the privacy policy.
The following formulas of LEDL cannot be elements of a privacy policy:
– Kra: no deontic operator
– KrKra→ KrOsKra: deontic operator preceded by a knowledge operator
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– KrOsKry∧Kre→ OsKry: condition is not a pure circumstance since it contains a de-
ontic operator
Privacy policies are typically set up by a law/policy maker and are imposed to the security
monitor (Sender), although they might also be set up by the Sender himself/herself. They
should be enforced in any case.
The set of epistemic norms is not necessarily complete. As a result, the Sender can
perfectly add other epistemic norms as long as they are consistent with the privacy policy,
depending on the particular situation at stake. This leads us to define the following no-
tions of permissive and restrictive privacy policies. Intuitively, a restrictive privacy policy
is a policy where only the permissions of the security policies hold, everything else being
forbidden. A permissive privacy policy is a policy where only the prohibitions of the se-
curity policy hold, everything else being permitted. These definitions are similar with the
definitions of permissive and restrictive approach of Cuppens and Demolombe (1997).
Definition 4 (Permissive and restrictive privacy policy) Let P be a privacy policy. The
set E (M,w) = {φ ∈LEL |M,w |= φ} represents the epistemic state of the Recipient.
– The privacy policy P is restrictive if for all EDL-models (M,w), if E (M,w)∪P 0
Psα , then M,w |= ¬Psα .
– The privacy policy P is permissive if for all EDL-models (M,w), if E (M,w)∪P 0
¬Psα , then M,w |= Psα .
Note that specifying whether a privacy policy P is restrictive or permissive specifies
completely what is permitted and forbidden to know for the Recipient in the pointed EDL-
model (M,w). As we said, in the general case, the privacy policy P does not specify all
the obligations that should hold in a situation (M,w).
We therefore define four notions of compliance. The first notion of compliance, called
regulatory compliance, checks whether the permissions and obligations set up by the se-
curity monitor (Sender) of an organization are consistent with the current privacy policy
P set up by the law/policy maker. The second notion of compliance, called behavioural
compliance, checks whether the obligationsOsα strictly following from the privacy policy
P given the epistemic state E (M,w) are enforced. The third notion of compliance, sim-
ply called compliance, corresponds to the conjunction of the regulatory and behavioural
compliance. The fourth notion of compliance, called strong compliance, checks regula-
tory compliance and whether all the obligations set up by the security monitor (Sender)
are enforced.
Definition 5 (Compliance) Let (M,w) be a pointed EDL-model and P a privacy policy.
– The situation (M,w) is regulatory compliant with respect to the privacy policy P if
and only if M,w |= Osα for all i→ Osα ∈P and M,w |= Psα for all i→ Psα ∈P .
– The situation (M,w) is behaviourally compliant with respect to the privacy policy P
if and only if M,w |= i→ α for all i→ Osα ∈P .
– The situation (M,w) is compliant with respect to the privacy policy P if and only if it
is regulatory and behaviourally compliant with respect to P .
– The situation (M,w) is strongly compliant with respect to P if and only if it is regula-
tory compliant with respect to P and M,w |= Osα → α for all α ∈L
α
EDL.
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When the privacy policy P is finite, we can express with a single formula whether the
current situation (M,w) is regulatory compliant, behaviourally compliant and compliant
with respect to P .
Proposition 1 Let P be a finite privacy policy. Let RegComp=
∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα∧
∧
i→Psα
Psα ,
BehComp=
∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→ α) and Comp= RegComp∧BehComp. Then,
– (M,w) is regulatory compliant with respect to P if and only if M,w |= RegComp;
– (M,w) is behaviourally compliant with respect to P if and only if M,w |= BehComp;
– (M,w) is compliant with respect to P if and only if M,w |=Comp.
The following proposition shows that for permissive privacy policies compliance is the
same as strong compliance. It also gives a semantic counterpart to the syntactic notion of
strong compliance: an epistemic state (represented by (M,R(w))) is strongly compliant
if there exists a corresponding ideal epistemic state (represented by (M,R(v)) for some
v ∈ D(w)) containing the same information (i.e. bisimilar3).
Proposition 2 Let (M,w) be a finite pointed EDL-model and P a privacy policy.
– If P is permissive, then (M,w) is compliant with respect to P if and only if (M,w) is
strongly compliant with respect to P .
– The situation (M,w) is strongly compliant with respect to P if and only if there exists
v ∈ D(w) such that (M,R(w)) and (M,R(v)) are bisimilar.
Proof
– The proof of the first item stems from the fact that if P is permissive, then for
all pointed EDL-models (M,w), M,w |= Osα for some α ∈ L
α
EDL if and only if
E (M,w)∪P ⊢ Osα . The right to left direction trivially trivially holds. Assume to-
wards a contradiction thatM,w |= Osα and E (M,w)∪P 0 Osα . Then, because P is
permissiveM,w |= ¬Osα , which is impossible.
– Let (M,w) be a finite pointed EDL-model strongly compliant with respect to P . As-
sume towards a contradiction that for all v ∈ D(w), R(w) and R(v) are not bisimi-
lar. Then there is v′ ∈ R(v) such that for all w′ ∈ R(w), (M,v′) and (M,w′) are not
bisimilar. Therefore, because M is finite, there is φ v ∈LEDL such that M,v
′ |= φ v and
M,w′ |= Kr¬φ
v. Then for all v ∈ D(w), M,v |= ¬Kr¬φ
v and M,w |= Kr¬φ
v. Hence,
M,w |= Os
( ∨
v∈D(w)
¬Kr¬φ
v
)
and M,w |=
∧
v∈D(w)
Kr¬φ
v. Let α =
∨
v∈D(w)
¬Kr¬φ
v, we
3 Two pointed models (M,v) and (M′,v′) are bisimilar if there is a relation Z onW ×W ′ such that vZv′ and
satisfying the following conditions:
Base: if wZw′, then for all p ∈Φφ , w ∈V (p) iff w′ ∈V ′(p);
Forth R: if wZw′ and u ∈ R(w), then there is u′ ∈ R(w′) such that uZu′;
Back R: if wZw′ and u′ ∈ R(w′), then there is u ∈ R(w) such that uZu′;
Forth D: if wZw′ and u ∈ D(w), then there is u′ ∈ D(w′) such that uZu′;
Back D: if wZw′ and u′ ∈ D(w′), then there is u ∈ D(w) such that uZu′.
If two pointed Kripke models are bisimilar then the formulas true at these two pointed models are the same,
i.e. then contain the same information (see Blackburn et al (2001) for more details). Two multi-pointed models
(M,S) and (M′,S′), where S⊆M and S′ ⊆M′, are bisimilar if for all w ∈ S there is w′ ∈ S′ such that (M,w) and
(M′,w′) are bisimilar, and for all w′ ∈ S′ there is w ∈ S such that (M,w) and (M′,w′) are bisimilar.
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then have that M,w |= Osα ∧¬α . This contradicts the assumption of strong compli-
ance.
Let (M,w) be a finite pointed EDL-model regulatory compliant with respect to P ,
and assume that there exists v ∈D(w) such that (M,R(w)) and (M,R(v)) are bisimilar.
Let α ∈L αEDL, then there are α
i
0,α
i
1, . . . ,α
i
ni
∈L αEDL such that α ↔
∨
i∈{1,...,k}
(Krα
i
0 ∧
¬Kr¬α
i
1∧ . . .∧¬Kr¬α
i
n) ∈ LEDL by definition of L
α
EDL. Assume thatM,w |= α . Then
there is i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that M,w |= Krα
i
0 ∧ ¬Kr¬α
i
1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Kr¬α
i
ni
. Because
(M,R(w)) and (M,R(v)) are bisimilar, we have that M,v |= Krα
i
0 ∧¬Kr¬α
i
1 ∧ . . .∧
¬Kr¬α
i
ni
. Indeed, assume towards a contradiction that M,v |= ¬Krα
i
0. Then there is
v′ ∈ R(v) such that M,v′ |= ¬α i0. Therefore, by our definition of bisimilarity, there
is w′ ∈ R(w) such that M,w′ |= ¬α i0, which contradicts the fact that M,w |= Krα
i
0.
The same reasoning holds if we assume that M,v |= Kr¬α
i
j. So, M,v |= α , and hence
M,w |= Pα . Therefore, we have proved that for all α ∈L αEDL, M,w |= α → Psα , i.e.,
for all α ∈L αEDL, M,w |= Osα → α . So, (M,w) is strongly compliant with respect to
P .
QED
Example 13 (Website example continued) Consider Example 4, where we have the map-
pings from the users to the numbers (c) and from the numbers to the websites (e), the
related mapping from the users to the websites they visited (v) such that c∧ e→ v. We
express the privacy policy P1 as:
P1 = {PsKrc,PsKre,¬PsKrv}
It states that it is permitted to know the mapping between users and numbers (PsKrc), it is
permitted to know the mapping between numbers and websites visited (PsKre) but it is not
permitted to know the mapping between users and their websites visited (¬PsKrv). In the
pointed EDL-model (M,w) of Figure 1, the accessibility relation R is represented by plain
lines and the accessibility relation D is represented by dashed lines. So for example, when
we have a plain line between two possible worlds w and v, it means that w ∈ R(v) and
v ∈ R(w), and when we have a dashed arrow from a possible world w to another possible
world v, it means that v ∈ D(w). Even if we do not represent it in the figure, we also have
that v∈R(v) for all worlds v∈M, and v∈D(v) for all worlds v∈M−{w}. Besides, it holds
14 Guillaume Aucher et al.
¬e,y ¬e,¬y
v : e,y   w : e,yoo e,¬y
Fig. 2 Spyware example.
that M |= c∧ e→ v. This pointed EDL-model (M,w) represents semantically a situation
which is compliant with respect to the privacy policy P1. Indeed, M,w |= P1, so the
situation is regulatory compliant with respect to P1. Moreover, the prohibition ¬PsKrv, or
equivalently the obligation Os¬Krv, of the privacy policy P1 is enforced becauseM,w |=
¬Krv. So the situation (M,w) is also behaviourally compliant. In fact the situation (M,w)
is also strongly compliant because, by application of Proposition 2, (M,R(w)) is bisimilar
to (M,R(v)) and v ∈ D(w).
Example 14 (Spyware example) Consider a situation where e is the list of websites men-
tioned and y is the fact that websites might contain risky software. The privacy policy is
expressed by a unique epistemic norm:
P2 = {y∧Kre→ OsKry}
It states that if the Recipient knows a list of websites (Kre) which might contain some risky
softwares (y), then the Recipient should know that some of these websites might contain
some risky softwares (OsKry). Note that the condition of this epistemic norm contains an
epistemic formula. In Figure 2 is depicted a situation compliant with this privacy policy.
Like in Figure 1, the accessibility relation R in this pointed EDL-model (M,w) is repre-
sented by plain lines and the accessibility relation D is represented by dashed lines. So for
example, when we have a plain line between two possible worlds w and v, it means that
w ∈ R(v) and v ∈ R(w), and the dashed arrow stemming from the possible world w to the
possible world v means that v ∈ D(w). Reflexive arrows are omitted, which means in this
EDL-model that for all v ∈ M, we have v ∈ R(v) and for all v ∈ M−{w}, {v} = D(v).
The situation is compliant with respect to the privacy policy P2. Indeed, the situation
is regulatory compliant because M,w |= P2. It is also behaviourally compliant, because
M,w |= y∧Kre→ Kry since M,w |= ¬(y∧Kre). However, it is not strongly compliant
because (M,w) is not bisimilar to (M,v).
We can generalize this kind of policies to stronger policies where the Sender has to inform
the Recipient whether a piece of information has some property or not as in Example 6.
3.2 The dynamic turn
3.2.1 Dynamic Epistemic Deontic Logic (DEDL)
We now add dynamics to the picture by means of messages sent to the Recipient and by
means of promulgations that change the obligations of the Sender. These actions affect the
situation respectively in two ways: either they affect the epistemic realm (represented in an
EDL-model by the relation R) or they affect the normative realm (represented in an EDL-
model by the relation D). This leads us to enrich the language LEDL with two dynamic
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operators [Send φ ] and [Prom α], yielding the language LDEDL. The formula [Send ψ]φ
reads as ‘after the Recipient learns ψ , φ holds’, and [Prom α]φ reads as ‘after the Sender
promulgates α , φ holds’.
Definition 6 (Syntax of LDEDL) The language LDEDL is defined inductively as follows:
LDEDL : φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧φ | Krφ | Osα | [Send φ ]φ | [Prom α]φ
L
α
DEDL : α ::= Krφ | ¬α | α ∧α | [Send φ ]α | [Prom α]α
where p ranges over Φφ .
We also have that L αDEDL ⊂LDEDL, just as we had L
α
EDL ⊂LEDL.
Example 15 The following formulas are members of LDEDL:
– [Send a]Kra The result of the Sender sending to the Recipient the address a is that the
Recipient knows a.
– [Send a](Kra∧¬PsKra): the Sender discloses some prohibited information a (because
¬PsKra), and this leads to a non (strongly) compliant situation.
– [Prom ¬Kre](PsKrc∧¬PsKre∧¬PsKrv): the Sender enforced the new privacy policy
P = {PsKrc,¬PsKre,¬PsKrv}.
The semantics of these dynamic operators is defined below, it is inspired by the logical
framework of Baltag et al (1998); Baltag and Moss (2004).
In the multi-agent setting of Baltag and Moss (2004), one is interested in modeling
the effect of (epistemic) actions on the beliefs of several agents. The perception of the
agents concerning these actions when they occur is represented by action models. An
example of action model is the one for private announcement whereby an agent B learns
ψ while the other agent A believes nothing is happening. The action model of this private
annoucement is the same as the EDL-frame Aψ of Figure 3, except that the accessibility
relation R has to be replaced by the epistemic accessibility relation of agent B and that
the accessibility relation D has to be replaced by the epistemic accessibility relation of
agent A. As a result of this private announcement, the beliefs of agent B are updated by ψ ,
whereas the beliefs of the agent A remain unchanged. This update is captured formally in
Baltag and Moss (2004) by an update product ⊗ taking as argument an epistemic model
and an action model, and yielding a new epistemic model. The definition of their update
poduct ⊗ is formally the same as our definition of the update products ⊕ and ⊙ below;
the only difference here is our intuitive interpretation of the action model and the update
product. As a result of the update⊕ by the EDL-frame Aψ , the knowledge of the Recipient
is updated by ψ whereas the obligations and permissions of the Sender remain unchanged.
Dually, as a result of the update ⊙ by the action model Aα , the obligations of the Sender
are updated by α whereas the knowledge of the Recipient remains unchanged. To this, we
add the condition that if the information sent to the Recipient is not true then it is ignored,
and the condition that if the norm to be promulgated is not true then it is also ignored.
Definition 7 (Semantics of LDEDL) Let M = (W,D,R,V,w) be a pointed EDL-model,
ψ ∈LEDL and α ∈L
α
EDL. Let Aψ = (Wψ ,Dψ ,Rψ) be the EDL-frame depicted in Figure 3
and defined byWψ = {wψ ,w⊤},Dψ = {(wψ ,w⊤),(w⊤,w⊤)} and R= {(wψ ,wψ),(w⊤,w⊤)}.
Let Aα = (Wα ,Dα ,Rα) be the EDL-frame depicted in Figure 3 and defined by Wα =
{wα ,w⊤}, Dα = {(wα ,wα),(w⊤,w⊤)} and R = {(wα ,w⊤),(w⊤,w⊤)}. We define the
EDL-models (M,w)⊕ψ and (M,w)⊙α as follows.
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Fig. 3 EDL-frames Aψ (left) and Aα (right).
– If M,w 2 ψ then (M,w)⊕ψ = (M,w), otherwise (M,w)⊕ψ = (M,w)⊗Aψ .
– If M,w 2 α then (M,w)⊙α = (M,w), otherwise (M,w)⊙α = (M,w)⊗Aα .
Let (M,w) be a pointed EDL-model and Aφ∗ = (Wφ∗ ,Dφ∗ ,Rφ∗) be an EDL-frame of the
form Aψ or Aα . The update product (M,w)⊗Aφ∗ = (W
′,D′,R′,V ′) is defined as follows.
– W ′ = {(w,wφ∗),(v,w⊤)
∣∣ w,v ∈W,M,w |= φ ∗};
– (v,v∗) ∈ D
′(w,w∗) iff v ∈ D(w) and v∗ ∈ Dφ∗(w∗);
– (v,v∗) ∈ R
′(w,w∗) iff v ∈ R(w) and v∗ ∈ Rφ∗(w∗);
– (w,w∗) ∈V
′(p) iff w ∈V (p).
The truth conditions of the dynamic operators [Send ψ] and [Prom α] are defined as fol-
lows.
M,w |= [Send ψ]φ iff M⊕ψ,w⊕ |= φ
M,w |= [Prom α]φ iff M⊙α,w⊙ |= φ .
where w⊕ = (w,wψ) ifM,w |= ψ , and w⊕ = w otherwise; and w⊙ = (w,wα) ifM,w |= α ,
and w⊙ = w otherwise.
Example 16 In Figure 4 is given an example of update with a formula of LEDL (i.e. a
circumstance) and in Figure 5 is given an example of update with a formula of L αEDL
(i.e. an epistemic practition). As in the previous representation of Figure 1, we omit in all
these EDL-model the accessibility relations s ∈ R(s), for all s ∈ M, and s ∈ D(s) for all
s ∈M−{w}.
In Figure 4, the update by e just removes the world accessible from w by R where e
does not hold, namely the world v. The rest of the model remains unchanged because all
the other worlds are accessible from w by a deontic accessibility relation D.
In Figure 5, the update by ¬Kre just removes the world accessible from w by D where
¬Kre does not hold, namely the worlds u and t. The rest of the model remains unchanged
because all the other worlds are either accessible from w via a world accessible by the
relationD and making ¬Kre true, or they are accessible from w by the accessibility relation
R.
Theorem 3 (Soundness and completeness) The logic LDEDL axiomatized by the follow-
ing axiom schemes and inference rules is sound and complete for LDEDL with respect to
the semantics of EDL-models. The symbol2 below stands either for [Send ψ] or [Prom α].
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We write ⊢ φ for φ ∈ LDEDL.
LEDL All the axiom schemes and inference rules of LEDL
A6 ⊢ ψ → ([Send ψ]Krφ ↔ Kr (ψ → [Send ψ]φ))
A7 ⊢ ¬ψ → ([Send ψ]φ ↔ φ)
A8 ⊢ [Send ψ]Osα ↔ Osα
A9 ⊢ [Prom α]Krφ ↔ Krφ
A10 ⊢ α → ([Prom α]Osα
′↔ Os(α → α
′))
A11 ⊢ ¬α → ([Prom α]φ ↔ φ)
A12 ⊢2p↔ p
A13 ⊢2¬φ
∗↔¬2φ ∗
A14 ⊢2(φ
∗→ ψ∗)→ (2φ ∗→2ψ∗)
R4 If ⊢ φ
∗ then ⊢2φ ∗
Proof We first prove a lemma.
Lemma 1 For all φ ∈LDEDL there is φ
′ ∈LEDL such that ⊢ φ ↔ φ
′. For all α ∈L αDEDL
there is α ′ ∈L αEDL such that ⊢ α ↔ α
′.
Proof of Lemma First, note that if ψ is a formula with dynamic operator then one shows
by induction on ψ using A6 to A14 that 2ψ is provably equivalent to a formula ψ
′ without
dynamic operator. Now, if φ is an arbitrary formula with n dynamic operators, it has a
subformula of the form 2ψ where ψ is without dynamic operators which is equivalent to
a formula ψ ′ without dynamic operators. So we just substitute2ψ by ψ ′ in φ and we get a
provably equivalent formula thanks to A14 and R4 with n−1 dynamic operators. We then
iterate the process. QED
As usual in dynamic epistemic logic, we use the previous key lemma to prove the theorem.
The soundness part is routine. Let φ ∈LDEDL such that |= φ . Then there is φ
′ ∈LEDL such
that ⊢ φ ↔ φ ′ by Lemma 1, and therefore |= φ ↔ φ ′ by soundness. But ⊢ φ ′ by Theorem
1, so ⊢ φ as well. QED
Axioms A9 to A11 model the fact that the operation of promulgation does not change
the knowledge of the Recipient but only the obligations and permissions of the Sender.
Axioms A6 to A8 model the fact that sending a message changes only the actual knowledge
of the Recipient. In particular, if we focus on the propositional knowledge of the Recipient,
then the combination of Axioms A6 and A7 boils down to
⊢ [Send ψ]Krφ ↔ ((ψ → Kr (ψ → φ))∧ (¬ψ → Krφ)) (1)
In other words, in this propositional case, if the message sent is not true then the knowledge
of the Recipient remains the same as before the sending, so the message is just ignored. But
if the message sent is true, then the knowledge of the Recipient is just conditionalized with
this new message. In particular, we can derive the following theorem for all propositional
formula ψ:
⊢ ψ → [Send ψ]Krψ (2)
This theorem means that after the Sender sends any truthful message to the Recipient, the
Recipient knows this message. The same line of reasoning holds for Axiom A10 and A11:
if the imperative α is not permitted then it is just ignored, but if α is permitted then the
obligations of the Sender are conditionalized by this imperative. These axioms entail that
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sending a message does not change the privacy policy (as a consequence of A8) in case
the antecedent of epistemic norms is propositionnal. They also entail that sending a mes-
sage does not change regulatory compliance. This is as expected: regulatory compliance
checks that the obligations and permissions set up by an organization (e.g. web-service,
institution) are compliant with respect to the privacy policy set up by a law/policy maker.
Therefore, this compliance should be independent from the context and the particular state
of the organization at a particular point in time, and therefore also independent from the
knowledge of the recipient at a particular point in time. The following proposition illus-
trates it.
Proposition 3 For all epistemic norms χ = i→ Osα or χ = i→ Psα where i is proposi-
tionnal, and for all ψ ∈LDEDL, we have that
⊢ χ → [Send ψ]χ (3)
Besides,
⊢ RegComp↔ [Send ψ]RegComp (4)
Proof We prove this property using the axioms of LDEDL.
1 ⊢ χ → χ
2 ⊢ χ → (i→ Osα)
3 ⊢ χ → ([Send ψ]i→ [Send ψ]Osα) by Axioms A8, A12 and A13
4 ⊢ χ → (¬[Send ψ]i∨ [Send ψ]Osα)
5 ⊢ χ → (¬[Send ψ]¬(¬i)∨ [Send ψ]Osα)
6 ⊢ χ → (¬[Send ψ]¬(¬i)∨¬[Send ψ]¬Osα) by Axiom A13
7 ⊢ χ →¬[Send ψ]¬(¬i∨Osα) by normality of [Send ψ]
8 ⊢ χ → [Send ψ](¬i∨Osα) by Axiom A13
7 ⊢ χ → [Send ψ](i→ Osα)
8 ⊢ χ → [Send ψ]χ
QED
Dually, promulgating a norm does not change the knowledge of the Recipient (as a
consequence of axiom A9).
The following theorem tells us that the model checking problem of our logic is tractable
and the same as for the language LEDL without the dynamic operators [Send ψ] and
[Prom α] (see Theorem 2).
Theorem 4 (Decidability and complexity) The satisfiability problem for LDEDL is de-
cidable. There is an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that, given a finite pointed EDL-model (M,w)
and a formula φ ∈LDEDL, determines, in time O(||M||× |φ |), whether M,w |= φ .
Proof Decidability (just as completeness of the axiomatization) comes from Lemma 1
because LEDL has the finite model property.
The model checking algorithm 1 works as follows. We label the worlds of the EDL-
model M with subformulas of φ in a particular order. We start with the formulas χ and α
appearing in the subformulas of φ of the form [Send χ]ψ and [Prom α]ψ . Then, we label
the other subformulas of φ . In particular, we use the reduction axioms A6 to A13 to label
formulas involving dynamic operators [Send χ]ψ or [Prom α]ψ . This step is made possible
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Algorithm 1 Model-Check((M,w),φ )
Input: A pointed EDL-model (M,w), φ ∈LDEDL
Output: True if M,w |= φ , False otherwise
Stack S = Empty Stack
Add1(S,φ)
Add2(S,φ)
5: while not Empty(S) do
ψ ← Pop(S)
for all w ∈M do
if ψ = p then
if w ∈V (p) then
10: Label(w,ψ)
end if
else if ψ = ¬ψ ′ then
if ψ ′ /∈ Label(w) then
Label(w,ψ)
15: end if
else if ψ = ψ ′ ∧ψ ′′ then
if ψ ′ ∈ Label(w) and ψ ′′ ∈ Label(w) then
Label(w,ψ)
end if
20: else if ψ = Krψ
′ then
Boolean b← True
for all (w,v) ∈ R do
if ψ ′ /∈ Label(v) then
b← False
25: end if
end for
if b= True then
Label(w,ψ)
end if
30: else if ψ = Osα then
Boolean b← True
for all (w,v) ∈ R do
if α /∈ Label(v) then
b← False
35: end if
end for
if b= True then
Label(w,Osα)
end if
40: else if ψ =2p then
if p ∈ Label(w) then
Label(w,ψ)
end if
else if ψ =2¬ψ ′ then
45: if 2ψ ′ /∈ Label(w) then
Label(w,ψ)
end if
else if ψ =2(ψ ′ ∧ψ ′′) then
if 2ψ ′ ∈ Label(w) and 2ψ ′′ ∈ Label(w)
then
50: Label(w,2(ψ ′ ∧ψ ′′))
end if
else if ψ = [Send χ]Krψ
′ then
if χ ∈ Label(w) then
Boolean b← True
55: for all (w,v) ∈ R do
if χ ∈ Label(v) and [Send χ]ψ ′ /∈
Label(w) then
b = False
end if
end for
60: if b = True then
Label(w, [Send χ]Krψ
′)
end if
else if Krψ
′ ∈ Label(w) then
Label(w, [Send χ]Krψ
′)
65: end if
else if ψ = [Send χ]Osα then
if Osα ∈ Label(w) then
Label(w, [Send χ]Osα)
end if
70: else if ψ = [Prom α]Krψ
′ then
if Krψ
′ ∈ Label(w) then
Label(w, [Prom α]Krψ
′)
end if
else if ψ = [Prom α]Osα
′ then
75: if α ∈ Label(w) then
Boolean b← True
for all (w,v) ∈ D do
if α ∈ Label(v) and [Prom α]α ′ /∈
Label(w) then
b = False
80: end if
end for
if b = True then
Label(w, [Prom α]Osα
′)
end if
85: else if Osα
′ ∈ Label(w) then
Label(w, [Prom α]Osα
′)
end if
end if
end for
90: end while
if φ ∈ Label(w) then
Return True
elseReturn False
end if
The symbol 2 in lines 43-51 stands for
[Send ψ] or [Prom α]. We use this notation
in order to avoid repeating the same instruc-
tions twice.
A Dynamic Logic for Privacy Compliance 21
Algorithm 2 Add1(S,φ)
Input: A Stack S and a formula φ
Output: The stack S added with the subformulas of φ ,
ignoring the subformulas χ and α of φ appearing
in dynamic operators [Send χ] and [Prom α] .
Push(S,φ)
if φ = ψ ∧ψ ′ then
Add1(S,ψ)
5: Add1(S,ψ
′)
else if φ = Krψ,¬ψ then
Add1(S,ψ
′)
else if φ = Osα then
Add1(S,α)
10: else if φ = [Send ψ]p then
Add1(S, p)
else if φ = [Send ψ]ψ ′ ∧ψ ′′ then
Add1(S, [Send ψ]ψ
′)
Add1(S, [Send ψ]ψ
′′)
15: else if φ = [Send ψ]¬ψ ′ then
Add1(S, [Send ψ]ψ
′)
else if φ = [Send ψ]Osα then
Add1(S,Osα)
else if φ = [Send ψ]Krψ
′ then
20: Add1(S, [Send ψ]ψ
′)
Add1(S,Krψ
′)
else if φ = [Prom α]p then
Add1(S, p)
else if φ = [Prom α]ψ ∧ψ ′ then
25: Add1(S, [Prom α]ψ)
Add1(S, [Prom α]ψ
′)
else if φ = [Prom α]¬ψ then
Add1(S, [Prom α]ψ)
else if φ = [Prom α]Osα
′ then
30: Add1(S, [Prom α]α
′)
Add1(S,Osα
′)
else if φ = [Prom α]Krψ then
Add1(S,Krψ)
end if
Algorithm 3 Add2(S,φ)
Input: A stack S and a formula φ
Output: The stack S added with the subformulas
χ and α of φ appearing in dynamic operators
[Send χ] or [Prom α]
if φ = ψ ∧ψ ′ then
Add2(S,ψ)
Add2(S,ψ
′)
5: else if φ = Osα then
Add2(S,α)
else if φ = Krψ,¬ψ then
Add2(S,ψ)
else if φ = [Send ψ]ψ ′ then
10: Push(S,ψ)
Add1(S,ψ)
Add2(S,ψ)
Add2(S,ψ)
else if φ = [Prom α]ψ then
15: Push(S,α)
Add1(S,α)
Add2(S,α)
Add2(S,ψ)
end if
because we already labelled the worlds of the EDL-model with the formulas χ and α .
This order of labelling is implemented by a stack S in algorithms 2 and 3 (Add1(S,φ) and
Add2(S,φ)). Algorithm Add1(S,φ) adds on the stack the subformulas of φ by ignoring the
content of messages χ and promulgation α . Besides, to make use of the reduction axioms,
dynamic formulas [Send χ]ψ and [Prom α]ψ are decomposed according to the reduction
axioms A6 to A13. Then the algorithm Add2(S,φ) adds on the stack the content of message
χ and promulgation α , which are themselves decomposed into subformulas by means of
Add1(S,χ) and Add1(S,α).
Termination of algorithms 1, 2 and 3 is ensured by the fact that within each of these
algorithms, calls to other algorithms are made with a formula of degree strictly smaller.
Correctness of these algorithms can be proved by induction using the truth conditions
of Definition 2 and the soundness of Axioms A6 to A13. As for complexity, we first
prove by induction that the running time of Add1(S,φ) is in O(|φ |1), and that the run-
ning time of Add2(S,φ) is in O(|φ2|). Informally, |φ |1 is the size of φ ignoring the dy-
namic operators [Send χ] and [Prom α].4 Dually, |φ |2 is the size of φ considering only
the formulas χ and α in the dynamic operators [Send χ]ψ and [Prom α]ψ in the sub-
4 Formally, |φ |1 is defined inductively as follows: |p|1 = 1, |¬φ |1 = |Krφ |1 = 1+ |φ |1, |φ ∧φ
′|1 = 1+ |φ |1+
|φ ′|1, |Osα|1 = 1+ |α|1, |[Send ψ]φ |1 = 1+ |φ |1, |[Prom α]φ |1 = 1+ |φ |1.
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formulas of φ .5 One can show by induction on φ that |φ | = |φ |1 + |φ |2. We only prove
the case [Send χ]Krψ for algorithm 2. By definition of Add1 and by induction hypoth-
esis, the running time of Add1(S, [Send χ]Krψ) is in O(|[Send χ]φ |1)+O(|Krψ|1)+ 1,
i.e. O(|ψ|1)+O(|Krψ|1)+ 1, i.e. O(|Krψ|1)+ 1, i.e. O(|[Send χ]Krψ|1). We only prove
the case [Send χ]φ for algorithm 3. By definition of Add2 and by induction hypothe-
sis, the running time of Add2(S, [Send χ]φ) is in 1+O(|χ|1) +O(|χ2|) +O(|φ |2), i.e.
1+O(|χ|)+O(|φ |2), i.e. O(|χ|)+O(|φ |2), i.e. O(|[Send χ]φ |2).
We show that the running time ofModel−Check(M,φ) is in O(||M||× |φ |). We show
the following invariant I:
Invariant I: at the start of each iteration of the while loop, of lines 5-90, the total
running time of the while loop is in O(||M||×x), where x is equal to the size of the
formula removed from the stack S in the previous loop and equal to 0 if none has
been removed yet.
We prove the Invariant by induction on the size of the previously removed formula. The
base case holds trivially. We prove the induction step only for the case where the previously
removed formula is of the form ψ = [Send χ]Krψ
′. One can easily show that for every
pair of formulas ρ,ρ ′ in stack S such that ρ ′ is on the top of ρ , we have that |ρ ′| < |ρ|.
Therefore, the total running time of the while loop before the removal of ψ is in O(||M||×
|ψ ′|), and therefore also in O(||M||× (|ψ|−1)). Now, the worlds of M have already been
labelled by the formulas χ , [Send χ]ψ andKrψ , because these formulas were placed on top
of [Send χ]Krψ in the stack S by definition of Add1 and Add2 (lines 3 and 4). Therefore,
we have to determine the complexity of the part of the algorithm between the lines 53 and
69. The running time of this part of algorithm 1 is in O(|R|), i.e. O(||M||). Hence, the total
running time of thewhile loop is inO(||M||×(|ψ|−1))+O(||M||) =O(||M||×|ψ|). This
proves the induction step.
Since the last formula removed from the stack is φ , we have that the total running time
of the while loop at the end of algorithm 1 is in O(||M|| × |φ |). Since the total running
time of Add1 and Add2 in lines 3 and 4 is in O(|φ |), we have that the total running time of
algorithm 1 is in O(||M||× |φ |). QED
3.2.2 Permitted and obligatory messages
Now that we have defined the notion of compliance and the dynamic operation [Send ψ] of
message sending and the way this message affects the knowledge of the recipient, we can
naturally derive and define the notions of permitted, prohibited and obligatory messages.
Obviously, given a privacy policy and a situation, some messages might not be permitted
by the privacy policy, because they might lead to a non-compliant situation. Moreover,
because we assumed that the Sender sends only truthfull message, a message permitted by
the privacy policy should be truthfull. This leads us to the following definition.
Definition 8 (Permitted message) Let φ ∈LDEDL, P be a privacy policy and (M,w) an
EDL-model representing a given situation. We say that it is permitted for the Sender to
send message φ according to P in (M,w), written M,w |= Ps(Send φ), if M,w |= φ and
(M⊕φ ,w) is compliant with respect to P .
5 Formally, |φ |2 is defined inductively as follows: |p|2 = 0, |¬φ |2 = |Krφ |2 = |φ |2, |φ ∧ φ
′|2 = |φ |2+ |φ
′|2,
|Osα|2 = |α|2, |[Send ψ]φ |2 = |ψ|+ |φ |2, |[Prom α]φ |2 = |α|+ |φ |2.
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Example 17 The following formulas illustrate permissions to send.
– ¬Ps(Send a): the Sender’s action [Send a] is not permitted.
– ¬Ps(Send m)→¬Ps(Send a): if it is prohibited to send the name of the street, then it
is prohibited to send the entire address.
– [Send e]¬Ps(Send c) and [Send c] ¬Ps(Send e):after sending one of the two messages,
the other one becomes prohibited.
– A message is permitted (Ps(Send a)), if sending it does not lead to a non-compliant
situation: i.e., if sending it does not violate some epistemic obligation (of the privacy
policy). For example, sending the message a ([Send a]) leads to a state where Krawhile
at the same time ¬PsKra (i.e., Os¬Kra).
The definition of an obligatory message is a bit more tricky. Typically, the Sender is
obliged to send a message when the situation is not compliant with respect to the privacy
policy and sending this message restores compliance. Besides, the amount of information
that the Sender should send in this context has to be minimal. For example, if it is oblig-
atory for the editor of the Journal of Artificial and Law that we know that the submission
deadline of the paper is the first of June, then he can either tell us that “the submission
deadline is the first of June” or “the submission deadline is the first of June and there
might be an extension”. The first announcement is obligatory but the second one is not
because the amount of information sent is not minimal, unless we should also know that
there might be an extension. This leads us to define the following notions.
Definition 9 (Informativeness of a formula) Let φ ,φ ∈ LDEDL and (M,w) an EDL-
model representing a given situation. We say that φ is more informative than φ ′ for the
Recipient in the situation (M,w), written M,w |= φ ≥ φ ′, if M,w |= Kr(φ → φ
′). φ is
strictly more informative than φ ′ for the recipient in the situation (M,w), written M,w |=
φ > φ ′, when M,w |= φ ≥ φ ′ but not M,w |= φ ′ ≥ φ .
Equipped with this notion of minimal information, we can now define formally the
notion of obligation to send.
Definition 10 (Obligatory message) Let φ ∈LDEDL, P be a privacy policy and (M,w)
an EDL-model representing a given situation. We say that it is obligatory for the Sender
to send message φ according to P in (M,w), written M,w |= Os(Send φ), if the situation
(M,w) is not compliant, sending φ restores compliance, and sending a message φ ′ strictly
less informative than φ does not restore compliance. Formally, M,w |= Os(Send φ) if
and only if M,w |= ¬Comp∧Ps(Send φ) and for all φ
′ ∈LDEDL, if M,w |= φ > φ
′ then
M,w 2 [Send φ ′]Comp.
Note that the notions of permitted and obligatory message in Definitions 8 and 10 are
both based on the notion of compliance. However, because of Proposition 3, this notion
could be replaced by the notion of behavioural compliance.
Remark 1 In fact, one could also replace this notion of compliance by the notion of strong
compliance. This would yield a stronger and a weaker notion of permitted and obliga-
tory message respectively. In the same line, we could also define the notions of permitted
promulgation and obligatory promulgation by replacing in these definitions the sending
of message [Send φ ] with a promulgation [Prom α] and by replacing the notion of (be-
havioural) compliance with the more appropriate notion of regulatory compliance.
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Example 18 (Website example continued) In Example 13, we have:
M,w |= Ps(Send c)∧Ps(Send e).
So it is permitted to send the mappings from the users to the numbers (c) and it is permitted
to send the mapping from the numbers to the web-sites (e). However, we also have
M,w |= [Send e]¬Ps(Send c) and M,w |= [Send c]¬Ps(Send e)
which means that after sending the mapping from the numbers to the web-sites (e) it is
not permitted to send the mapping from the users to the numbers (c), and vice versa for
the second conjunct. This is because in both cases we would violate the epistemic norm
¬PsKrv:
M,w |= [Send e][Send c](Krv∧¬PsKrv) and
M,w |= [Send c][Send e](Krv∧¬PsKrv).
We also have
M,w |= ¬Ps(Send (e∧ c)).
Our approach is flexible because it is applicable in infinitely many other contexts than
the one of the above example, once the privacy policy is fixed. For example, assume that
the hash function computing the mapping from users to numbers is now available (h) and
that the Recipient is able to apply it to get the mapping from numbers to users (c):
M |= h→ c.
Applying the same reasoning, we would get:
M,w |= [Send e]¬Ps(Send h)
M,w |= ¬Ps(Send (e∧h))
and so we derive the forbidden messages without having to introduce explicitly new pro-
hibitions or permissions on h.
Privacy policies do not only concern which information are permitted to be disclosed,
but also which information should be disclosed. Example 15 illustrates that we can express
such policies due to the fact that our epistemic deontic logic can express obligations about
knowledge, unlike the one of Cuppens and Demolombe.
Example 19 (Spyware Example continued) After sending the message e in the previous
situation represented by the pointed EDL-model (M,w) of Figure 2 we obtain the pointed
EDL-model (M⊕e,w) depicted in Figure 6. The corresponding situation (M⊕e,w) is still
regulatory compliant with respect to P2 = {y∧Kre→ OsKry}, because M⊕ e,w |= P2.
However, it is not behaviorally compliant with respect to P2, becauseM,w |= (y∧Kre)∧
¬Kry. Therefore, it was forbidden to disclose e:
M,w |= ¬Ps(Send e)
But it is now obligatory (with respect to P2) to disclose y:
M⊕ e,w |= Os(Send y)
So we have that
M,w |= [Send e]Os(Send y)
M,w |= ¬Ps(Send e)∧Ps(Send (e∧ y)).
As it turns out, after sending the message y we reach a compliant situation.
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Fig. 6 Spyware example updated.
The above example suggests that even if it is prohibited to send message e, it might
still be permitted to send message e as long as it is followed by another message y. We
leave the investigation of the permissibility of iterative messages for future work.
In privacy policies, the permission to disclose the names of users also allows to disclose
their family names (which are part of their name). This problem, discussed in Example 3,
is known as the inference problem, and is in general difficult to model (see for instance
Barth et al (2006)). In our logical framework it follows easily from the fact that the Re-
cipient has reasoning capabilities. The following proposition illustrates this point. In this
proposition, a propositional privacy policy is a privacy policy where all antecedent i of
epistemic norms are propositional and all α in i→ Osα are of the form Krψ or ¬Krψ ,
where ψ is a propositional formula.
Proposition 4 Let P be a propositional privacy policy and φ ,φ ′ ∈LDEDL,
⊢Comp→
(
(φ ≥ φ ′)→
(
Ps(Send φ)→ Ps(Send φ
′)
))
(5)
Therefore,
If ⊢ φ → φ ′ then ⊢Comp→
(
Ps(Send φ)→ Ps(Send φ
′)
)
(6)
Proof Assume that M,w |= φ and that for all i→ Osα ∈P , M,w |= i→ α and M,w |=
[Send φ ](i→ α), i.e. M,w |= i→ [Send φ ]α by Axioms A12−A14. We have to show that
for all i→ Osα ∈P , M,w |= [Send φ
′](i→ α), i.e. M,w |= i→ [Send φ ′]α by Axioms
A12−A14.
– If M,w |= ¬i then trivially M,w |= i→ [Send φ ′]α .
– If M,w |= i then we have to show that M,w |= [Send φ ′]α .
– if α = Krψ , then M,w |= Krψ by assumption. Therefore, M,w |= Kr(φ
′ → ψ).
Therefore, M,w |= [Send φ ′]Krψ by Axiom A6, i.e. M,w |= [Send φ
′]α .
– if α = ¬Krψ , then M,w |= [Send φ ]¬Krψ by assumption. Therefore, M,w |=
Kˆr(φ ∧¬ψ) by Axioms A6 and A13. However, because M,w |= φ ≥ φ
′, we also
have that M,w |= Kˆr(φ
′ ∧¬ψ). Then, M,w |= [Send φ ′]¬Krψ by Axioms A6 and
A12−A14. Therefore, M,w |= [Send φ
′]α .
In any case, we have proved that for all i→Osα ∈P ,M,w |= [Send φ
′](i→α). Therefore
M,w |= [Send φ ′]BehComp.
Now, because the privacy policyP is propositional, we also have thatM,w |= [Send φ ′]
RegComp because M,w |= RegComp. So, finally, M,w |= [Send φ ′]Comp, and so M,w |=
Ps(Send φ
′). QED
Example 20 (Website example continued) Assume we have a situation modeled by an
EDL-model M such that M |= v→ v′: the association between the users’ name and the
web-sites they visited (v) induces the association between the users’ family name and the
web-sites they visited (v′). So if M,w |= Ps(Send v) then M,w |= Ps(Send v
′): if it is per-
mitted to disclose the name of the users in association with the websites they visited, it is
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also permitted to disclose their family name in association with the websites they visited.
Dually, if M |= v→ v′, then M,w |= ¬Ps(Send v
′) implies M,w |= ¬Ps(Send v): if it is
prohibited to disclose their family names in association with the websites they visited then
it is also prohibited to disclose their names in association with the websites they visited.
The following property connects the notions of permitted and obligatory messages: for
all φ ,φ ′ ∈LDEDL,
⊢ φ > φ ′→
(
Os(Send φ)→¬Ps(Send φ
′)
)
(7)
This proposition illustrate the minimality feature of our definition of obligatory mes-
sage: if φ is strictly more informative that φ ′, then the obligation to send φ entails that
sending φ ′ will not lead to a compliant situation. Moreover, note that Os(Send φ) and
Ps(Send φ) are not dual operators:
0 Os(Send φ)↔¬Ps(Send ¬φ) (8)
This is intuitively correct: in Example 19 it is prohibited to disclose e but it does not entail
that it is obligatory to disclose ¬e. We also have the following property:
0 Ps(Send φ)∧Ps(Send ψ)→ Ps(Send (φ ∧ψ)) (9)
Indeed, in Example 18 we had M,w |= Ps(Send e)∧Ps(Send c)∧¬Ps(Send (e∧ c)). The
next example describes the interaction between meta-policy and actions.
Example 21 Consider the meta-policy of Example 9, where p should not be known and it
is prohibited to let the Recipient know the policy that knowing p is prohibited:
P4 = {¬PsKrp,¬PsKr¬PsKrp}
In this situation, not only sending the message [Send p] but also sending the message
[Send ¬PsKrp] lead to a violation:
⊢P4 →¬Ps(Send PsKrp).
As shown in Proposition 3, the privacy policy persists during the sending of the message.
However, our logic LDEDL does not allow us to derive that sending to the Recipient the
piece of information whereby he should not know that p implies that as a result of this
sending he actually knows p:
0 P4 → [Send ¬PsKrp]Krp.
This is nevertheless a theorem in an extension of our logic spelled out in the appendix.
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Fig. 7 Website example of Figure 1 updated by ¬Kre.
3.2.3 Enforcing privacy policies: [Prom α]
The hierarchical superior of the Sender or the Sender himself might decide to change the
policy privacy from P to P ′. As a result, the sender needs to enforce this new privacy
policy P ′. This enforcement is captured in our formalism by [Prom α].
Example 22 (Website Example) In case of attack by some hacker, the privacy policies can
be made more strict. For example, the Sender can decide to strengthen the privacy policy
P1 of Example 13 to
P5 = {PsKrc,¬PsKre,¬PsKrv}
where PsKre has been replaced by ¬PsKre: it is now prohibited to disclose the mapping
from numbers to visited websites. This new privacy policy P5 can be enforced by the
Sender through the update [Prom ¬Kre]. We get the EDL-model (M⊙¬Kre,w) visualized
in Figure 7 which is compliant with respect to P5.
4 A privacy logic for security monitors
If the Sender, viewed as a security monitor, wanted to use our logic in real situations to
decide which actions to execute in order to enforce and maintain a privacy policy, then he
could implement an EDL-model representing the current epistemic and deontic state of
affairs. He could then check compliance with respect to a given policy and determine
which actions can and should be done to enforce and maintain this privacy policy by
model checking this EDL-model. However, with the current language LDEDL, the Sender
would have to face some problems. For example, he could not check whether a situation
is regulatory or behaviourally compliant with respect to a given privacy policy P because
privacy policies are not represented in (the syntax of) the language LDEDL. This language
LDEDL would not allow him to express that an epistemic norm is added or removed to/from
the privacy policy by the law/policy maker. This language would not allow him to decide
which actions he needs to do so that the new situation is regulatory compliant. It would
not allow him to express that under the current privacy policy he is permitted to disclose
φ . These kinds of statements are all needed if we want the security monitor (Sender) to
be able to enforce and maintain a privacy policy in real situations. So we need to define
a new language based on LDEDL more appropriate in the context of privacy policy. This
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language should allow the security monitor to refer explicitly to the current privacy policy,
which was not explicitly introduced in the previous language. We propose the following
language LPL.
Definition 11 (Syntax of LPL) The language LPL is defined inductively as follows:
LPL : φ ::= ψ | (χ ∈P) | RegComp | BehComp |Comp | Ps(Send ψ) |
[Send ψ]φ | [Prom α]φ | [+χ]φ | [−χ]φ | ¬φ | φ ∧φ
where ψ ranges over LDEDL, α ranges over L
α
DEDL and χ ranges over E N . We assume
here that the set of epistemic norms E N is finite.
So we have seven new kinds of formulas referring each of them directly or indirectly to
privacy policies: (χ ∈P), RegComp, BehComp, Comp, [+χ]φ , [−χ]φ and Ps(Send ψ).
The formula (χ ∈ P) reads as ‘χ is an epistemic norm of the current privacy policy’.
The formula RegComp reads as ‘the current situation is regulatory compliant with respect
to the current privacy policy’. The formula BehComp reads as ‘the current situation is
behaviourally compliant with respect to the current privacy policy’. The formula Comp
reads as ‘the current situation is compliant with respect to the current privacy policy’.
Note that this constant Comp is similar in spirit to the violation constant v of Anderson
(1958): Comp is somehow equivalent to ¬v. The formula [+χ]φ reads as ‘after adding
the epistemic norm χ to the current privacy policy, φ holds’. The formula [−χ]φ reads
as ‘after removing the epistemic norm χ from the current privacy policy, φ holds’. The
formula Ps(Send ψ) reads as ‘sending the message ψ is permitted’. This language allows to
express all the new kinds of statement we wanted to express above. For example, ¬Comp∧
[Send ψ]Compmeans that the current situation is not compliant with respect to the privacy
policy but if ψ is disclosed then the situation becomes compliant with this privacy policy.
The semantics for this language is a bit different from the semantics of LDEDL because
we have to refer explicitly in the language to privacy policies. Intuitively, {(M,w),P} in
the definition below is the situation (M,w) which has to comply with the privacy policy
P .
Definition 12 (Semantics of LPL) A (pointed) privacy model is a pair {M,P} (resp.
{(M,w),P}) composed of an EDL-modelM (resp. (M,w)) together with a privacy policy
P . The truth conditions are defined inductively as follows:
{(M,w),P} |= ψ iff M,w |= ψ
{(M,w),P} |= (χ ∈P) iff χ ∈P
{(M,w),P} |= RegComp iff M,w |= Psα for all i→ Psα ∈P and
M,w |= Osα for all i→ Osα ∈P
{(M,w),P} |= BehComp iff M,w |= i→ α for all i→ Osα ∈P
{(M,w),P} |=Comp iff {(M,w),P} |= RegComp∧BehComp
{(M,w),P} |= Ps(Send ψ) iff M,w |= ψ and {(M,w),P} |= [Send ψ]Comp
{(M,w),P} |= [Send ψ]φ iff {(M⊕ψ,w⊕),P} |= φ
{(M,w),P} |= [Prom α]φ iff {(M⊙α,w⊙),P} |= φ
{(M,w),P} |= [+χ]φ iff {(M,w),P ∪{χ}} |= φ
{(M,w),P} |= [−χ]φ iff {(M,w),P−{χ}} |= φ
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Note that the semantics of RegComp, BehComp and Comp correspond exactly to the
definitions of these notions we gave in Definition 5. Likewise, the semantics of Ps(Send ψ)
corresponds to the definition of this notion we gave in Definition 8.
Theorem 5 (Soundness and completeness) The logic PL axiomatized by the following
axiom schemes and inference rules is sound and complete for the language LPL with
respect to the semantics of privacy models. The symbol [±χ] below stands either for [+χ]
or [−χ]. The symbol 2 stands either for [Send ψ] or [Prom α].
LDEDL All the axioms schemes and inference rules of LDEDL
P1 ⊢ BehComp↔
∧
χ=i→Osα∈E N
((χ ∈P)→ (iχ → αχ))
P2 ⊢ RegComp↔
∧
χ=i→Osα∈E N
((χ ∈P)→ Osα)∧
∧
χ=i→Psα∈E N
((χ ∈P)→ Psα)
P3 ⊢Comp↔ (RegComp∧BehComp)
P4 ⊢ Ps(Send ψ)↔ (ψ ∧ [Send ψ]Comp)
P5 ⊢2(χ ∈P)↔ (χ ∈P)
P6 ⊢2¬φ ↔¬2φ
P7 ⊢2(φ → φ
′)→ (2φ →2φ ′)
P8 ⊢ [+χ](χ ∈P)
P9 ⊢ [−χ]¬(χ ∈P)
P10 ⊢ [±χ](χ
′ ∈P)↔ (χ ′ ∈P) for all χ ′ ∈ E N −{χ}
P11 ⊢ [±χ]ψ ↔ ψ
P12 ⊢ [±χ]¬φ ↔¬[±χ]φ
P13 ⊢ [±χ](φ → φ
′)→ ([±χ]φ → [±χ]φ ′)
RP If ⊢ φ then ⊢ [±χ]φ
Proof (sketch) Soundness is routine, we only prove completeness. We use the same method
as for the proof of Theorem 3. Axioms P5 to P13 and rule RP allow to reduce any PL-
consistent formula φ of LPL to a PL-consistent formula φ
′ of LPL without dynamic oper-
ators, i.e. a formula which is a boolean combination of ψ ∈LDEDL and (χ ∈P). We can
then equivalently rewrite this formula φ ′ in disjunctive normal form:
φ ′ =
∨
i∈{1,...,k}
(
ψ i∧ (χ i1 ∈P)∧ . . .∧ (χ
i
m ∈P)∧¬(χ
i′
1 ∈P)∧ . . .∧¬(χ
i′
n ∈P)
)
where for all i∈ {1, . . . ,k}, ψ i ∈LDEDL and all j, χ
i
j,χ
i′
j ∈ E N . Because φ
′ is consistent,
there must be a i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that ψ i ∧ (χ i1 ∈P)∧ . . .∧ (χ
i
m ∈P)∧¬(χ
i′
1 ∈P)∧
. . .∧¬(χ i
′
n ∈ P) is PL-consistent. Then, ψ
i is PL-consistent, and therefore also LDEDL-
consistent. Henceforth, by Theorem 3, there is a pointed EDL-model (M,w) such that
M,w |= ψ i. Besides, it suffices to define P as P = {χ ij
∣∣ j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} to finally have
that {(M,w),P} |= φ ′. Therefore, because ⊢ φ ↔ φ ′ and by soundness of PL, we also
have that {(M,w),P} |= φ . So φ is satisfiable in a privacy model. QED
If φ ∈ LPL, we define |φ |, the size of φ , to be the number of symbols in φ .
6 If P is a
finite privacy policy then |P|= |
∧
P|. The following theorem states in particular that the
6 Formally, |φ | is defined inductively as follows: if φ = ψ ∈ LDEDL, then |φ | is defined as in Footnote 2;
otherwise, |φ | = 1+ |φ |, |φ ∧ φ ′| = 1+ |φ |+ |φ ′|, |(χ ∈ P)| = 1, |RegComp| = 1, |BehComp| = 1, |Comp| =
1, |Ps(Send ψ)|= 1+ |ψ|, |[Send ψ]φ |= 1+ |ψ|+ |φ |, [+χ]φ |= 1+ |χ|+ |φ |, |[−χ]|φ = 1+ |χ|+ |φ |
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computational complexity of the model checking problem for our new language LPL is
basically the same as for the language LDEDL except that the size of the privacy policy P
has to be added to the size of the modelM and the formula φ in O(||M||×|φ |) of Theorem
4.
Theorem 6 (Decidability and complexity) The satisfiability problem for LPL is decid-
able. There is an algorithm (Algorithm 4) that, given a pointed privacy model {(M,w),P}
and a formula φ ∈ LPL, determines, in time O((||M||+ |P|)× (|φ |+ |P|)), whether
{(M,w),P} |= φ .
Proof Algorithms AddP1 and Add
P
2 (i.e. algorithms 5 and 6) called on lines 3 and 4 are
given in the appendix. Because they terminate, algorithm 4 also terminates. Correctness
of algorithm 4 is ensured by the truth conditions of language LPL which are spelled out
in Definition 12. As for complexity, the proof is similar to Theorem 4. First, at each iter-
ation of the while loop, there are at most O(||M||+ |P|) operations, the worst case being
obtained between lines 9 and 22. Now, we have to determine the size of the stack S. This
size corresponds to the number of times the procedure Push is called in algorithms 5 and
6. As one can easily notice, by definition of algorithm 5, the number of times this happens
in AddP1 (S,(φ ,P)) is |φ |
1
P
, where |φ |1
P
is defined as follows:
|ψ|1
P
= |ψ| |[Send ψ]φ |1
P
= |φ |1
P
|¬φ |1
P
= 1+ |φ |1
P
|[Prom α]φ |1
P
= |φ |1
P
|φ ∧φ ′|1
P
= 1+ |φ |1
P
+ |φ ′|1
P
|[+χ]φ |1
P
= 1+ |φ |1
P∪{χ}
|BehComp|1
P
= 1+ |
∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→ α)| |[−χ]|1
P
= 1+ |φ |1
P−{χ}
|RegComp|1
P
= 1+ |
∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα ∧
∧
i→Psα∈P
Psα| |(χ ∈P)|
1
P
= 1
|Comp|1
P
= 1+ |
∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα ∧
∧
i→Psα∈P
Psα ∧
∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→ α) |1
P
|Ps(Send ψ)|
1
P
= 1+ |[Send ψ](
∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→ α)∧ (
∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα ∧
∧
i→Psα∈P
Psα))|
1
P
Similarly, the number of times the procedure Push is called in AddP2 (S,φ ,P) is |φ |
2
P
,
where |φ |2
P
is defined as follows:
|ψ|2
P
= 0 |Comp|2
P
= 0
|¬φ |2
P
= |φ |2
P
|Ps(Send ψ)|
2
P
= 1+ |ψ|2
P
+ |ψ|1
P
|φ ∧φ ′|2
P
= |φ |2
P
+ |φ ′|2
P
|[Send ψ]φ |2
P
= 1+ |ψ|1
P
+ |ψ|2
P
+ |φ |2
P
|(χ ∈P)|2
P
= 0 |[Prom α]φ |1
P
= 1+ |α|1
P
+ |α|2
P
+ |φ |2
P
|RegComp|2
P
= 0 |[+χ]φ |2
P
= |φ |2
P∪{χ}
|BehComp|2
P
= 0 |[−χ]φ |2
P
= |φ |2
P−{χ}
Therefore, the size of the stack S after the call of AddP1 (S,(φ ,P)) and Add
P
2 (S,φ ,P)
is |φ |1
P
+ |φ |2
P
. However, one can easily prove by induction on φ that for all φ ∈ LPL,
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Algorithm 4 Model-Check({(M,w),P},φ )
Input: A privacy model {(M,w),P}, φ ∈ LPL. The
privacy policy P is implemented by a list.
Output: True if {(M,w),P} |= φ , False otherwise
StackS← EmptyStack
AddP1 (S,(φ ,P))
AddP2 (S,φ ,P)
5: while not Empty(S) do
(ψ,P)← Pop(S)
if ψ ∈LDEDL then
Model−CheckP ((M,w),(ψ,P))
else if ψ = (χ ∈P) then
10: Boolean b← False
χ ′←P.head
while P 6= NULL and not b do
if χ ′ = χ then
b← True
15: end if
χ ′←P.next
end while
if b then
for all w ∈M do
20: Label(w,(ψ,P))
end for
end if
else
for all w ∈M do
25: if ψ = RegComp then
if (
∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα,P) ∈ Label(w)
and(
∧
i→Psα∈P
Psα,P) ∈ Label(w) then
Label(w,(ψ,P))
end if
30: else if ψ = BehComp then
if (
∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→ α) ,P) ∈ Label(w)
then
Label(w,(ψ,P))
end if
else if ψ =Comp then
35: if (
∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα,P) ∈ Label(w)
and(
∧
i→Psα∈P
Psα,P) ∈ Label(w)
and(
∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→ α) ,P) ∈ Label(w) then
Label(w,(ψ,P))
end if
else if ψ = ¬ψ ′ then
40: if (ψ ′,P) /∈ Label(w) then
Label(w,ψ,P)
end if
else if ψ = ψ ′ ∧ψ ′′ then
if (ψ ′,P) ∈ Label(w) and (ψ ′′,P) ∈
Label(w) then
45: Label(w,(ψ,P))
end if
else if ψ = Ps(Send ψ
′) then
if (ψ,P) ∈
Label(w)and[Send ψ]
∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→ α) ∧∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα ∧
∧
i→Psα∈P
Psα,P) ∈ Label(w)
then
Label(w,(ψ,P))
50: end if
else if ψ =2(χ ∈P) then
if ((χ ∈P),P) ∈ Label(w) then
Label(w,(ψ,P)
end if
55: else if ψ =2¬ψ ′ then
if (2ψ ′,P) /∈ Label(w) then
Label(w,(ψ,P))
end if
else if ψ =2(ψ ′ ∧ψ ′′) then
60: if (2ψ ′,P) ∈ Label(w) and
(2ψ ′′,P) ∈ Label(w) then
Label(w,(ψ,P))
end if
else if ψ = [+χ ]ψ ′ then
if (ψ ′,P ∪{χ}) ∈ Label(w) then
65: Label(w,(ψ,P))
end if
else if ψ = [−χ ]ψ ′ then
if (ψ ′,P−{χ}) ∈ Label(w) then
Label(w,(ψ ′,P))
70: end if
end if
end for
end if
end while
75: if φ ∈ Label(w) then
Return True
elseReturn False
end if
The algorithmModel−CheckP is the same
as algorithm 1 except that all the ex-
pressions of the form Label(w,ψ) have
to be subsituted in Model −CheckP by
Label(w,(ψ,P)) and all the expressions of
the form ψ ∈ Label(w) have to be sub-
stituted by (ψ,P) ∈ Label(w). The algo-
rithms AddP1 and Add
P
2 are defined in the
appendix as algorithms 5 and 6 respectively.
The symbol 2 in lines 43-51 stands for
[Send ψ] or [Prom α]. We use this notation
in order to avoid repeating the same instruc-
tions twice.
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|φ |1
P
+ |φ |2
P
= |φ |P , where |φ |P is defined inductively as follows:
|ψ|P = |ψ| |[+χ]φ |P = 1+ |φ |P∪{χ}
|¬φ |P = 1+ |φ |P |[−χ]φ |P = 1+ |φ |P−{χ}
|φ ∧φ ′|P = 1+ |φ |P + |φ
′|P |Ps(Send ψ)|P = |[Send ψ]Comp|P
|(χ ∈P)|P = 1 |[Send ψ]φ |P = 1+ |ψ|P + |φ |P
|BehComp|P = 1+ |
∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→ α)| |[Prom α]φ |P = 1+ |α|P + |φ |P
|Comp|P = 1+ |
∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα ∧
∧
i→Psα∈P
Psα ∧
∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→ α) |
|RegComp|P = 1+ |
∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα ∧
∧
i→Psα∈P
Psα|
Now, one proves by induction on φ ∈LPL that |φ |P = O(|φ |+ |P|). We only prove
the cases |BehComp|P and |[−χ]φ |P : |BehComp|P = 1+ |
∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→α)|= 1+O(|
∧
χ∈P
χ|)=
1+O(|P|) = |BehComp|+O(|P|); |[−χ]φ |P = 1+ |φ |P−{χ} = 1+ |φ |+O(|P −
{χ}|) = 1+ |φ |+O(|P|) = O(1+ |φ |+ |P|) = O(1+ |φ |+ |χ|+ |P|) = O(|[−χ]φ |+
|P|).
Hence, the total running time of the while iteration between lines 5 and 74 is in
O((||M||+ |P|)× (|φ |+ |P|)). One proves similarly as above and by induction that
the running time of AddP1 and Add
P
2 (i.e. algorithms 5 and 6) is in O(|φ |+ |P|), tak-
ing into account the fact that the instructions of lines 49 and 51 are executed in time
O(1) and O(P) respectively. So, finally, the total runing time of algorithm 4 is in time
O((||M||+ |P|)× (|φ |+ |P|)). QED
Example 23 The mechanisms involved in the website example can be better analysed and
understood with this new language. In Example 13, the initial situation is compliant with
respect to the current privacy policy:
{(M,w),P1} |=Comp.
Note that it was not possible to express this with the previous languageLDEDL. The Sender
then learns by the security administrator that the new privacy policy is P5. This change
boils down to first removing the epistemic norm PsKre ( [−PsKre]) and then adding the
epistemic norm ¬PsKre ([+¬PsKre]). The situation is no longer compliant with this new
privacy policy because it is not regulatory compliant anymore with the privacy policy P5:
{(M,w),P1} |= [−PsKre][+¬PsKre]¬RegComp.
Therefore, the Sender now has to enforce this new privacy policy P5 by means of a pro-
mulgation. He does so by promulgating the norm ¬Kre. That was the process described in
Example 22:
{(M,w),P5} |= ¬RegComp∧ [Prom ¬Kre]Comp.
We see in the above example that the language LPL really allows the security monitor to
reason about which actions he can perform so that a new privacy policy be enforced or so
that the situation be compliant with respect to the privacy policy.
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5 Related work
Comparison with the Cuppens-Demolombe logic. Cuppens and Demolombe (1996) ex-
tend their original framework (Cuppens, 1993) by using an epistemic deontic logic to
model security in databases. Their modal language is actually a restriction of our language
LEDL and is defined as follows:
L : φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧φ | PsKuψ | OsKuψ
where ψ ranges over propositional formulae and p over Φφ . Their semantics in terms of
Kripke models is the same as ours. However, their accessibility relation for the modality
Kuφ is not reflexive because it stands for “the user knows that the database believes φ” and
is therefore the combination of two modalities, the modality for knowledge being reflexive
and the modality for belief being serial. Nevertheless, if we assume that our modality Kr is
serial and give it the same reading as their reading, then our formalism clearly embeds their
formalism. Overall, we improve the Cuppens-Demolombe logic in the following respects:
Actions. Our logic also deals with actions. They just define privacy policies in terms of
the permitted and forbidden knowledge of the recipient of information, but they do not
derive the permitted messages by combining and reasoning on this knowledge like us.
Obligations. Our logic also deals with obligations. This is a desirable feature since, as
Barth et al (2006) notice, privacy laws actually specify which counter measures should
apply in case a situation is not compliant with a privacy policy. We can express in our
logic not only that it is obligatory to know whether something holds but also that it is
obligatory to send a message.
Meta-policies. Our logic can also express meta-policies. These are policies about how to
access the policy itself, like for example PsKrPsKrp. In our logic, we can even send a
message stating that it is permitted that the Recipient knows p. The problem is that in
some cases some sensitive information may be deduced by the Recipient by disclosing
the policy itself.
Policy change. Our logic also deals with change of privacy policy. They cannot express
that a new epistemic norm is added or removed from the current privacy policy, as we
illustrated it in Example 23.
Planning/Enforcement. Given that their logic does not deal with actions, they cannot a
fortiori reason about the effects of actions and plan which action should be executed in
order to enforce a given privacy policy. This is possible in our logic, and we illustrate
it in Example 23.
Given that our approach is based on their model, their solutions to several problems can
naturally be transferred in our setting. For example, they show that multi-level security
policies which assign a degree of clearance l to formulae φ and which might be incomplete
can be expressed in their framework by indexing the modality PsKrφ with the degree of
clearance l: the formula PsKrlφ reads as ‘an agent r cleared at level l is explicitly permitted
to know that the database believes φ ’. They also avoid possible conflicts between roles
and policies by defining the role of an agent as an index i of the modality PsKriφ and by
introducing an external structure on these roles.
Other related work. Languages for access control in security have been used for modeling
privacy regulations too (Bishop, 2003). However, they are not easily adapted to the new
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task, because they do not provide ways of reasoning about the information and about
effects of messages. Moreover, they rarely consider the context of communication.
Specific languages for privacy policies have been proposed, but have some limitations.
Extensible Access Control Markup Language XACML’s policies (Moses, 2005) can lead
to obligations, but “obligation” is just an uninterpreted symbol which receives meaning
at the point of policy enforcement. Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language EPAL’s
policies (Karjoth and Schunter, 2002) are concerned with a single sender (the enterprise
itself) and a single recipient role. EPAL structures obligations with a subsumption relation
rather than allowing to reason about knowledge. The Platform for Privacy Preferences
(P3P) language (Cranor, 2002) contains only positive norms and a temporal dimension
restricted to opt-in and opt-out conditions.
Bonatti et al (1995) use a similar logical framework for reasoning about security in
database access. They explicitly model the beliefs of the user of the database and the
actions which change these beliefs. However, again they only use combined epistemic
and deontic operators, in the sense that they do not make an explicit distinction between
epistemic and deontic modalities, with resulting limitations such as the impossibility to
model permissions and obligations about actions. Moreover, the belief change mechanism
is superimposed to Kripke semantics, while we use a general dynamic epistemic logic
approach and we are also able to change permissions and obligations and not only beliefs.
As they do, by distinguishing the point of view of the database (Sender) from the beliefs of
the user (Recipient), we could model situations where the sender of information is lying,
even if this possibility seems less useful in the context of privacy policies. Finally, we can
model meta-policy in our framework, to specify that it is prohibited to know the privacy
policy. Differently from their work, we also provide a semantics to meta-policy since we
allow nestings of epistemic and deontic modalities.
Barth et al (2006) propose a formalization of the theory of privacy called contextual
integrity. They introduce positive and negative norms, depending on whether they refer
to actions that are allowed or disallowed. Temporal conditions are modelled by means of
linear temporal logic with past and future operators to express, for example, that certain in-
formation may be disclosed only if the subject mentioned has previously given permission
or that if certain information is made public, notification must be sent to the concerned
party. These norms are interpreted in a model of agents who respect the norms if the trace
history of their communication satisfies a temporal formula constructed from the norms by
taking the disjunction over positive norms and the conjunction over negative norms. Their
language constitutes an advancement with respect to other policy languages, both for the
temporal aspect and for including a relation enabling agents to combine messages to com-
pute additional information about the subject, (e.g., computing postal code from postal
address), elucidating the notion of a “data hierarchy” found in P3P and EPAL. However,
their privacy policies cannot be changed. On the other hand, we do not consider the tem-
poral aspect yet: to incorporate this aspect in our model it might be necessary to resort to
an epistemic temporal logic, as in Pacuit et al (2006). Pacuit et al (2006) also introduce a
logic combining deontic and epistemic notions but they can express only particular epis-
temic norms called knowledge-based obligations of the form Krφ → Osψ , where ψ does
not contain any knowledge operator.
DeYoung et al (2010) extend Barth et al (2006) to apply the model to privacy laws
such as HIPAA and GLBA, including support for self-reference, purposes of uses and dis-
closures, some dynamics concerning roles and beliefs of principals. This extension goes
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in the direction of our work, showing the need to introduce dynamics and epistemic oper-
ators, while we leave for future work the treatment of self-references such as “except as
otherwise provided in this subchapter”.
A problem of Barth et al (2006) is the obscurity of the formalism used to model legal
norms, which in turn present ambiguities and difficulties. To cope with this problem, Lam
et al (2009) propose a more readable formalism based on logic programming. Our modal
logic aims at improving readability too, but at the same time it allows to study precisely
the properties of the deontic operators.
Logic or logic programming used in the papers discussed above (see also Barker
(2002)) are not the only methodologies to formalize privacy policies. May et al (2006) use
an extension of access control matrix operations to include operations for notification and
logging and constructs that ease the mapping between legal and formal language. They ap-
ply their methodology to HIPAA policies of health insurance. Nielson and Nielson (2007)
propose to use pi-calculus for privacy in the context of service oriented architectures.
A further issue in privacy is the interaction between policies and the organizations
which have to enforce them. This is addressed, e.g., by Barth et al (2007) and Kanovich
et al (2007). Our plan to address this problem is to extend the modal language to a multi-
agent language in order to express obligations, beliefs, knowledge and goals of the differ-
ent parties involved.
In dynamic epistemic logic, Balbiani et al (2009) focus in a multi-agent setting on the
notion of permission to announce. They provide a sound, complete and decidable logic
by enriching public announcement logic with the operator P(ψ,φ) which reads ‘after ψ
has been publicly announced, it is permitted to say φ ’. There is no privacy policy nor
compliance, although the specification of such a policy could be somehow derived via the
specification of their operator P(ψ,φ) (whose first argument handles the dynamic charac-
ter of the situations they consider). But as in all the other approaches mentioned, the (im-
plicit) privacy policy is specified directly on the announcements/actions and the epistemic
character of the situations they consider does not really play a role. Finally, in their logic,
privacy policies cannot change and they do not have a notion of obligatory announcement
or enforcement.
Other work in dynamic deontic logic (Meyer, 1988; Van der Meyden, 1996) extends
dynamic logic with obligations using a violation constant, and define that an action is
obliged if the absence of occurence of the action leads to a violation state. They are inter-
ested in particular in logical relations among obligations, and therefore in obligations of
complex actions such as sequences of actions.
This paper is an extended and revised version of Aucher et al (2010b). In a companion
paper (Aucher et al, 2010a) we show how to express the distinction between descriptive
and prescriptive obligations in dynamic epistemic deontic logic.
6 Conclusion
Summary. Classical problems of security such as the Chinese wall problem (Brewer and
Nash, 1989) need a more fined-grained analysis taking into account the dynamic context.
It might be permitted to know something but not to send a message containing this piece
of information, depending on the particular situation. In our website example, which is an
instance of this Chinese wall problem, even if it is permitted to know the mapping of users
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with their respective numbers (PsKrc) it is not permitted to send it (Ps(Send c)) if the map-
ping of numbers with the visited websites (e) is already known or has been sent before. On
the other hand, privacy policies are often defined in terms of permitted messages (actions),
for example in traditional access control languages (Bishop, 2003; Cranor, 2002; Moses,
2005; Karjoth and Schunter, 2002), but this direct representation of privacy policies in
terms of permitted messages is difficult to manage in a dynamic context. Instead, in this
paper we derived the permitted (and obligatory) messages from ‘static’ privacy policies
defined in terms of permitted and obligatory knowledge. To specify and reason about such
privacy policies, we extended a multi-modal logic introduced by Cuppens and Demolombe
with update operators modeling the dynamics of both knowledge and privacy policies. We
then defined a richer language that allows us to check whether a situation is compliant with
respect to a privacy policy and to determine which actions should be executed in order to
enforce a privacy policy. We axiomatized and proved the decidability of our logic and we
studied its complexity properties.
Potential application. In order to use this logic in real situations, the security monitor
(Sender) would need to implement a privacy model representing the current epistemic and
deontic state of affairs. He could then check compliance with respect to a given policy and
determine which actions can and should be done by model checking this privacy model
with algorithm 4. The low complexity of this algorithm is a sign that this kind of applica-
tion of our logic is feasible and realistic.
Future work. A topic for further research is to deal with multi-agent scenarios involving
more agents than just a Sender and a Recipient, each agent having its own privacy policy
to comply with. Many privacy issues deal with more persons than only a sender and re-
ceiver. For example, you may be permitted to know your medical file, while it may not
be permitted that someone not being a doctor sends you your medical file. Or you may
be permitted to know the budget, while at the same time being forbidden to know who
else knows the budget. You may tell your poker agent never to inform your opponents
about your cards to hide your bluff strategy, or tell your medical database that it may give
only generic information, not information about specific individuals. . . In this multi-agent
setting, the distinction between permitted action and knowledge is still relevant: you may
tell your web agent never to reveal to your boss which websites you have visited either by
specifying that your boss may never know which websites you visited, or by specifying
directly that it may not send your boss a list of the websites you have visited.
Another topic for further research is to enrich the dynamics to allow not only oper-
ations which promulgate norms but also operations which contract (derogate) or revise
norms. Indeed, even if our language LPL allows us to remove or add epistemic norms
from/to the privacy policy, sometimes promulgation might not be enough to enforce these
new epistemic norms and we might need to resort to more fine-grained dynamics like con-
traction or revision, as in AGM theory of belief change (Alchourro´n et al, 1985). This
enrichment of the dynamics would allow for example to model declassification of docu-
ments.
Finally, we plan to study the consequences of our logic for deontic logic. The distinc-
tion between permitted and forbidden knowledge and permitted and forbidden actions is
known in the deontic logic literature as the distinction between ought-to-be and ought-to-
do, expressed respectively by O(p) and O(α), where O is a modal operator, p a proposi-
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tions, and α an action. It is well known that the translation of ought-to-be to ought-to-do
and vice versa is a non-trivial challenge (Horty, 2001).
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A An extension of Castan˜eda’s deontic logic
In this appendix, we give an extension of our epistemic deontic logic embedding Castan˜eda’s deontic logic
(Castan˜eda, 1981). Starting from a linguistic analysis, the insight of Castan˜eda is to acknowledge the grammatical
duality of expressions depending on whether they are within or without the scope of an obligation operator. This
leads him formally to introduce two sets of formulas: circumstances which cannot alone be the foci of deontic
operators, unlike what he calls practitions. The former are usually expressed grammatically in the indicative
form and the latter are usually expressed grammatically in the infinitive/subjunctive form. For example, “Freud
cures Anna O” in the indicative form is a circumstance, but the same sentence in “it is obligatory that Freud
cures Anna O” in subjunctive/infinitive form is a practition. Just as practitions are the foci of deontic operators,
circumstances are dually the foci of knowledge operators, as pointed out by Castan˜eda (1988). In that respect,
note that an expression φ in the scope of a knowledge operator Krφ is always in the indicative form and never in
the subjunctive/infinitive form, even if Krφ is in the scope of a deontic operator O.
We extend Castan˜eda (1988)’s intuition to the context of epistemic permissions and obligations. In a deontic
setting the reading of the term knowledge or belief can be twofold: either as a circumstance or as a practition.
On the one hand, in the sentence “it is obligatory that John knows / for John to know that there is an infinity
of prime numbers”, the verb ‘to know’ is the focus of a deontic operator and is in the subjunctive/infinitive
form. On the other hand, the sentence “John knows that there is an infinity of prime numbers” alone describes a
circumstance and the interpretation of the verb ‘to know’ in the indicative form matches the one usually studied
in epistemic logic. The former use of the term knowledge within the scope of a deontic operator is not studied
in epistemic logic. For these reasons we enrich the language of Castan˜eda with two knowledge modalities, one
for circumstances Kr and the other one for epistemic practitions K
′
r . This allows us to express new kinds of
statements which cannot be expressed directly with our language LDEDL, such as
Os(Krφ → K
′
rψ) (10)
Formula 10 reads as ‘it is obligatory for the Sender that, if the Recipient knows φ then he also knows ψ’.
In our language LDEDL, this statement would be expressed by the intuitively equivalent but formally different
expression:
Krφ → OsK
′
rψ (11)
Formula 11 reads as ‘if the Recipient knows φ then it is obligatory for the Sender that the Recipient also knows
ψ’. Both of these formulations 10 and 11 are intuitively equivalent, but they are both intuitively different from
the following expression:
Os(K
′
rφ → K
′
rψ) (12)
40 Guillaume Aucher et al.
Formula 12 reads as ‘if it is obligatory for the Sender that the Recipient knows φ then it is also obligatory for the
Sender that the Recipient knows ψ’. Note that this last formulation 12 is itself also quite similar to the reading
of the formula OsK
′
rφ → OsK
′
rψ . Formulas 10 is not a well-formed formula of our language LDEDL, but it is a
well-formed formula of the following language LDL.
Definition 13 Let Φα be a set of propositionnal letters. The language LDL = L
φ ′
EDL ∪L
α ′
EDL, whose formulas
are denoted φ∗ in general, is defined inductively as follows.
L
φ ′
EDL : φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧φ | Krφ | Osα
L
α ′
EDL : α ::= β | Krφ | ¬α | α ∧α | α ∧φ | φ ∧α
where p ranges over Φφ and β over Φα .
The only difference with the language LDL is that we now have pure practitions Φ
α and that practitions can now
be of the form φ ∧α or φ → α where φ is a circumstance. Pure practitions Φα are expressions in the scope of a
deontic operator that cannot be expressed with a knowledge operator, such as ‘to cure Anna O’ in ‘it is obligatory
to cure Anna O’. Therefore, just as epistemic practitions, they are in the subjunctive/infinitive form. Moreover,
with this definition of practitions we can also express formulas of the form Os(φ → α) and in particular Formula
10 above. Obviously, we would like to have the following validity:
|= Os(φ → α)↔ (φ → Osα)
which is a generalization to the epistemic case of Castan˜eda’s key validity. For example, “it is obligatory that if
Freud knows that Anna O is sick, then he cures her” (Os(Krφ → α)) has the same meaning as “if Freud knows
that Anna O is sick, then it is obligatory that he cures her” (Krφ → Osα). This would also make Formulas 10
and 11 formally equivalent. To obtain this validity, we need to add an extra condition (∗) in our definition of
EDL-model and so define EDL-model’.
Definition 14 An EDL-model’M is a tupleM= (W,D,R, R′,V ),whereW is a non-empty set of possible worlds,
R :W → 2W , R′ :W → 2W and D :W → 2W are accessibility relations onW , D being serial. V : Φφ ∪Φα → 2W
is a valuation such that:
for all w ∈W , all v,v′ ∈ D(w)∪{w}, (M,v) is RD-bisimilar to (M,v′).7 (∗)
The truth conditions are defined as in Definition 14.
The semantic condition (∗) intuitively means that the (epistemic) context where a normative system applies is
fixed. One can easily show that any Castan˜eda model (Castan˜eda, 1981) can be embedded into an EDL-model’,
in the sense that the Castan˜eda model and the corresponding EDL-model’ satisfy the same formulas of L ′EDL
without epistemic operators Kr or K
′
r . One can also show that the semantics of L
′
EDL is sound and complete with
respect to the logic LEDL to which we add the axiom scheme ⊢ Os(φ → α)↔ (φ → Osα).
Theorem 7 The semantics ofL ′EDL is sound and complete with respect to the logic L
′
EDL axiomatized as follows.
The symbol K below stands either for Kr or K
′
r .
A1 All propositional tautologies based on Φ
φ
A2 ⊢ Os(φ → α)↔ (φ → Osα)
A3 ⊢ Osα → Psα
A4 ⊢ Os(α → α
′)→ (Osα → Osα
′)
A5 ⊢ K(φ
∗→ ψ∗)→ (Kφ∗→ Kψ∗)
R1 If ⊢ α then ⊢ Osα
R2 If ⊢ φ
∗ then ⊢ Kφ∗
R3 If ⊢ φ
∗→ ψ∗ and ⊢ φ∗ then ⊢ ψ∗
7 Two pointed models (M,v) and (M′,v′) are RD-bisimilar if there is a relation onW ×W ′ satisfying the base
condition for Φφ and the back and forth conditions for R and D (see footnote 3 or Blackburn et al (2001) for
details).
A Dynamic Logic for Privacy Compliance 41
Proof Soundness is routine.We prove completeness by building the canonical model of our logic. LetW be the set
of all maximal L′EDL-consistent subsets of LDL. For all Γ ,Γ
′ ∈W , we set Γ ′ ∈ R(Γ ) iff for all Krφ ∈ Γ ,φ ∈ Γ
′.
We define Os and R
′ similarly. Besides, for all Γ ∈W , Γ ∈ V (p) iff p ∈ Γ , and Γ ∈ V (β ) iff β ∈ Γ . We have
therefore defined the canonical model M = (W,D,R,R′,V ). We now show by induction on φ the ‘truth lemma’:
for all Γ ∈W and φ ∈ LDL, M,Γ |= φ iff φ ∈ Γ (1). If Γ = p then (1) holds. The other boolean cases work
by induction hypothesis. Assume φ = Krφ
′. If Krφ
′ ∈ Γ then for all Γ ′ ∈ R(Γ ), φ ′ ∈ Γ ′ by definition of R.
So M,Γ ′ |= φ ′ for all Γ ′ ∈ R(Γ ) by induction hypothesis, i.e., M,Γ |= Krφ
′. If M,Γ |= Krφ
′ then assume that
S ⊆ {φ ∈LDL | Krφ ∈ Γ }∪{¬φ
′} is consistent. It follows that there is Γ 0 ∈W such that S ⊆ Γ 0. So there is
Γ 0 ∈ R(Γ ) such that ¬φ ′ ∈ Γ 0. ThereforeM,Γ |= ¬Krφ
′ which is absurd. So S is inconsistent and so there must
be φ1, . . . ,φn ∈ S such that ⊢ (φ1 ∧ . . .∧ φn)→ φ ′. By R2 and A5 we get ⊢ (Krφ
1 ∧ . . .∧Krφ
n)→ Krφ
′ and
because Krφ
i ∈Γ , we finally have Krφ
′ ∈Γ . The proof is similar for the operators Os and K
′
r . One can also show
that D is serial.
Now we have to show that condition (∗∗) holds in our canonical modelM. We first show that for all Γ ∈W ,
all Γ ′,Γ ′′ ∈D(Γ )∪{Γ }, Γ ′ ! Γ ′′,i.e., for all φ ∈L
φ ′
EDL, φ ∈ Γ
′ iff φ ∈ Γ ′′. Let φ ∈L
φ ′
EDL and assume φ ∈ Γ
′.
If φ /∈ Γ then ¬φ ∈ Γ , and Osα ∈ Γ for some α ∈L
α
EDL. So M,Γ |= ¬φ ∧Osα , therefore M,Γ |= Os(¬φ ∧α).
ThenM,Γ ′ |= ¬φ ∧α , and so ¬φ ∈ Γ ′. This is impossible, so φ ∈ Γ . By the same reasoning we get that φ ∈ Γ ′′.
Likewise vice versa. We now show that ! is a RD-bisimulation relation. Assume Γ ! Γ ′. The base case for
Φφ clearly works. We prove the forth condition for R. Let Γ1 ∈ R(Γ ) and let Γ
∗
1 = {φ ∈ L
φ ′
EDL | φ ∈ Γ1} and
assume that for all Γ ′1 ∈ R(Γ
′) it is not the case that Γ1 ! Γ
′
1 , i.e., Γ
∗
1 * Γ
′
1 . Let S1 = Γ
∗
1 −
⋃
Γ ′1∈R(Γ
′)
Γ ′1 and let us
define S = S1 ∪S2 where S2 = {φ ∈L
φ ′
EDL | Krφ ∈ Γ }. S is consistent, because S ⊆ Γ1. So there is Γ2 ∈W such
that S⊆ Γ2. But {φ ∈L
φ ′
EDL | Krφ ∈ Γ
′}= {φ ∈L
φ ′
EDL | Krφ ∈ Γ
′}= {φ ∈L
φ ′
EDL | Krφ ∈ Γ } because Γ ! Γ
′.
Γ2 ∈ R(Γ
′) and S1 ⊆ Γ2 which is impossible by assumption. So there is Γ
′
1 ∈ R(Γ ) such that Γ
∗ ⊆ Γ ′1 , i.e., such
that Γ1 !Γ
′
1 . The same reasoning applies for the back condition. It also applies for the back and forth conditions
for D by replacing S2 by S
′
2 = {α ∈L
α ′
EDL | Osα ∈ Γ }. QED
Axioms A1 to A4 and rules R1 and R3 provide an alternative axiomatization of Castan˜eda’s language. We can
then derive in this logic the following theorems. In particular, note that our notion of knowledge is truthful, even
if it was not explicitly mentionned in the axiomatization.
Proposition 5 For all φ ∈LEDL,
⊢ K′rφ → φ (13)
⊢ Krφ → φ (14)
⊢ OsK
′
rφ → φ (15)
⊢ ¬PsK
′
rφ → φ (16)
Equation 16 allows us to derive that as a result of informing the recipient that he should not know that φ holds,
this very Recipient actually learns that φ holds. Indeed, as a result of sending this message, the Recipient knows
that he should not know φ (Kr¬PsK
′
rφ ), and therefore by application of Equation 16, he also knows that φ (Krφ ).
This derivation was not possible in our logic LDEDL, as we noted it in Example 9.
B Algorithms AddP1 and Add
P
2
Algorithms AddP1 andAdd
P
2 below (i.e. algorithms 5 and 6) are called in algorithm 4. They are adapted from
algorithms Add1 and Add2 (i.e. algorithms 2 and 3) to take into account the presence of the privacy policy P in
the language LPL.
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Algorithm 5 AddP1 (S,(φ ,P))
Input: A Stack S, a formula φ ∈ LPL and a privacy
policy P
Output: The stack S added with the subformulas of
φ , ignoring the subformulas ψ and α of φ ap-
pearing in dynamic operators [Send ψ], [Prom α]
and Ps(Send ψ), and replacing the subformulas
RegComp,BehComp,Comp and Ps(Send ψ) by
their definition.
Push(S,(φ ,P))
if φ = ψ ∧ψ ′ then
AddP1 (S,(ψ,P))
5: AddP1 (S,(ψ
′,P))
else if φ = Krψ,¬ψ then
AddP1 (S,(ψ
′,P))
else if φ = Osα then
AddP1 (S,(α,P))
10: else if φ = (χ ∈P) then
AddP1 (S,((χ ∈P),P))
else if φ = [Send ψ]p then
AddP1 (S,(p,P))
else if φ = [Send ψ]ψ ′ ∧ψ ′′ then
15: AddP1 (S,([Send ψ]ψ
′,P))
AddP1 (S,([Send ψ]ψ
′′,P))
else if φ = [Send ψ]¬ψ ′ then
AddP1 (S,([Send ψ]ψ
′,P))
else if φ = [Send ψ]Osα then
20: AddP1 (S,(Osα,P))
else if φ = [Send ψ]Krψ
′ then
AddP1 (S,([Send ψ]ψ
′,P))
AddP1 (S,(Krψ
′,P))
else if φ = [Prom α]p then
25: AddP1 (S,(p,P))
else if φ = [Prom α](χ ∈P) then
AddP1 (S,((χ ∈P),P))
else if φ = [Prom α]ψ ∧ψ ′ then
AddP1 (S,([Prom α]ψ,P))
30: AddP1 (S,([Prom α]ψ
′,P))
else if φ = [Prom α]¬ψ then
AddP1 (S,([Prom α]ψ,P))
else if φ = [Prom α]Osα
′ then
AddP1 (S,([Prom α]α
′,P))
35: AddP1 (S,(Osα
′,P))
else if φ = [Prom α]Krψ then
AddP1 (S,(Krψ,P))
else if φ = RegComp then
AddP1 (S,(
∧
i→Psα∈P
Psα ∧
∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα,P))
40: else if φ = BehComp then
AddP1 (S,(
∧
i→Osα∈P
i→ α,P))
else if φ =Comp then
AddP1 (S,RegComp,P))
AddP1 (S,(
∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα ∧
∧
i→Psα∈P
Psα ∧∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→ α) ,P))
45: else if φ = Ps(Send ψ) then
AddP1 (S,([Send ψ](
∧
i→Osα∈P
(i→ α) ∧∧
i→Osα∈P
Osα ∧
∧
i→Psα∈P
Psα),P))
else if φ = [+χ]φ then
P ←P ∪{χ}
AddP1 (S,(φ ,P))
50: else if φ = [−χ]φ then
P ←P−{χ}
AddP1 (S,(φ ,P))
end if
Algorithm 6 AddP2 (S,φ ,P)
Input: A stack S, φ ∈PPL, and a privacy policy P
Output: The stack S added with the subformulas ψ
and α of φ appearing in dynamic operators of the
form [Send ψ], [Prom α] or Ps(Send ψ)
if φ = ψ ∧ψ ′ then
AddP2 (S,(ψ,P))
AddP2 (S,(ψ
′,P))
5: else if φ = Osα then
AddP2 (S,(α,P))
else if φ = Krψ,¬ψ then
AddP2 (S,(ψ,P))
else if φ = [+χ ]ψ then
10: AddP2 (S,(ψ,P ∪{χ}))
else if φ = [−χ ]ψ then
AddP2 (S,(ψ,P−{χ}))
else if φ = [Send ψ]ψ ′ then
Push(S,ψ)
15: AddP1 (S,(ψ,P))
AddP2 (S,(ψ,P))
AddP2 (S,(ψ
′,P))
else if φ = [Prom α]ψ then
Push(S,α)
20: AddP1 (S,(α,P))
AddP2 (S,(α,P))
AddP2 (S,(ψ,P))
else if φ = Ps(Send ψ) then
Push(S,ψ)
25: AddP1 (S,(ψ,P))
AddP2 (S,(ψ,P))
end if
